Dispute Resolution and Legitimacy in Kacerere
Examples from Two Land Disputes

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Acknowledgements

It may or may not be a universal fact that no accomplishment is the accomplishment of one man alone, but regarding this paper it is absolutely true. I could never have gone through with the field research without the caring support from my parents. Whatever I accomplish in life will also be their accomplishment, just like they are the first line on which I fall back whenever I fail to do so.

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Abstract

Through this paper, two cases of land dispute resolution have been introduced. While one case was regarded as a ”good” dispute resolution the other was considered a “bad” one, and the latter was in its essence a rather tragic story. The less fortunate man in that dispute resolution did not only lose part of the land that supported him, but it also left him excluded from the community in many aspects. This constitutes the problem that has driven the paper from sheet to sheet. If not the fate of this specific individual, then at least the phenomenon it represents. During the last few years, behavioral aspects have shed new light on the ever so common condition of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, and in these aspects the phenomenon of social exclusion plays an important role. This paper has been an approach towards these matters from a perspective of political behavior and resource distribution. In an attempt to explain differences in legitimacy and social outcomes, the institutional profiles of the two dispute resolution processes were examined. The findings indicated multi-dimensional breaches of legitimacy, all related to a decision by the less fortunate dispute owner in the ”bad” dispute resolution to take matters to the government. The analysis found that the micro-level arena of resource distribution was intimately tied to a macro-arena of authoritative distribution between the governmental authorities and the traditional ones found in this peripheral community. Combined with the institutional analysis performed, this supports the hypothetical involvement of a meta-norm, intended to protect the traditional authorities from alternative ones, such as the government. Perhaps leaving more questions than it actually answered, this paper may inspire to further endeavors in fields of governmental decentralization, as such work would probably be the most fruitful way to mend the gap between governmental and traditional authorities. Furthermore, this paper might direct some attention to the importance of institutional research regarding meta-norms, since this could provide a viable approach for political scientists to study the urgent matter of behavioral poverty in sub-Saharan Africa.
# Contents

INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................. 1
AIM OF THIS PAPER ........................................................................................................... 3
RESEARCH METHODS ......................................................................................................... 3

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION ................................................................................................. 9
INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY ................................................................................................. 9
LEGITIMATION OF POWER ................................................................................................. 12
OPERATIONALIZATION ......................................................................................................... 13

TWO CASES OF LAND DISPUTE RESOLUTION ................................................................. 15
ADMINISTRATION AND PRACTICES CONCERNING LAND ............................................. 15
EXAMPLES FROM TWO RESOLVED DISPUTES .............................................................. 18
WHAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE THE DISPUTES ............................................................... 19

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION .............................................................................................. 22
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS ................................................................................................. 22
LEGITIMACY ANALYSIS .................................................................................................. 25
DISCUSSION ......................................................................................................................... 28

REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 32

APPENDIX A ......................................................................................................................... 35
APPENDIX B ......................................................................................................................... 36
APPENDIX C ......................................................................................................................... 37
APPENDIX D ......................................................................................................................... 38
Introduction

Kacerere is a small but still growing village in the extreme south of Uganda. It is actually so far south that it is easier to cross the mountains to Rwanda than to reach Kampala, the capital city of Uganda. Winston Churchill once called the region “The Switzerland of Africa” (Fountain Publishers Ltd. 2007: 167) and the landscape is truly resembling the scenery of central Europe. The village is home to hundreds of individuals, all descending from two brothers who moved there about one century ago, and just about everybody makes a living from farming even if they have a profession that they call their own. The farming is deeply rooted in these people, and despite a diversity of problems in the village – such as poverty and starvation as a result of natural catastrophes – few choose to move to any of the more sizable cities or communities in the country.

Several decades ago, two land disputes were resolved in Kacerere. This is not a strange matter in itself, since land is indeed a scarce resource in the village, but these two cases – the Kirwa Muruhanga and the Nyarurambi-Kikonokwa land disputes – serve well to exemplify this common phenomenon. Both of the disputes advantaged the same man – a man who is now a powerful individual in the village – while two other men lost land that could have supported them well. Hence, in aspects of resource distribution the two cases are very similar, but in aspects of social outcomes for the less fortunate dispute owners there are major differences between the cases, visible even today. While the disadvantaged
dispute owner in the *Kirwa Muruhanga* dispute managed to recover from the loss of land by keeping his position in the village, the less fortunate man in the *Nyarurambi-Kikonokwa* dispute was crippled by social exclusion after the dispute resolution. While the former case is currently referred to as a “good” dispute resolution by the villagers, the latter is referred to as a “bad” one.

These normative statements could be referring to the legitimacy of actions taken in the each dispute resolution process, an interpretation supported by David Beetham’s reasoning regarding the normative structures of legitimacy (Beetham 1991: 64-99). This interpretation makes ‘legitimacy’ itself a central concept in the reasoning to follow in this paper. In the relevant context, it refers to support for an authority by its subjects in the actions taken by the authority (Weber 1964: 324-328). An ‘authority’ could be governmental or traditional, but might just as well be a powerful individual. As the concept of authority implies rightfulness, the concept of ‘elite’ can be used for actors attempting authoritative action without that legible rightfulness and ‘mass’ for its subjects (Lasswell 1958: 13-27). Further discussion regarding these concepts and their interrelation are provided in the theoretical chapter.

Another central matter of this paper is the dispute resolution process. The concept of ‘dispute’ should firstly be distinguished from the commonly misused concept of ‘conflict’. Conflict can in itself be divided into different phases – including phases of escalation or crisis leading to phases of violence – and the dispute is only the first phase in a conflict (Alker at al. 2001: 22). Hence, the dispute resolution process could involve negotiation, mediation, arbitration and in a modern society also lawsuits, while a conflict resolution process may involve peacekeeping or even peace enforcement (ibid. 362). The dispute resolution process is not tied to a certain authority of dispute resolution, but rather to the dispute owners and the specific dispute subject.

By now, it is important to make clear distinction between authorities of dispute resolution and actors within a dispute resolution who *attempt* authoritative action. While the authorities of dispute resolution are traditional or governmental authorities assigned to resolve the dispute, the actors who attempts authoritative
action are individuals trying to gain from the dispute by controlling it in some way. Using the terminology applied in this paper, these actors who attempt authoritative action are elite. The most common example of the elite is the dispute owners themselves, who try to win the dispute by promoting their perspective on the dispute matter. Depending on how these attempted authoritative actions are received by the mass, legitimacy or illegitimacy is ascribed to them.

Aim of this paper
Could the reference to the two introduced land disputes as “good” and “bad” respectively actually be statements regarding the legitimacy of actions taken in each dispute resolution process? This paper is an attempt to answer that question by elucidating how differences in the two dispute resolution processes relate to theory of legitimacy and legitimacy deficit.

Research methods
The research that this paper lifts forward is one of predominantly qualitative methods. While quantitative methods of measurement should always be accounted for rigorously, an approach as this one is not as easily evaluated. Hence, the weight of result replicability is almost negligible through the perspective that there are no facts of society (Weber 1964: 88). What there are, however, are different understandings of reality (Gadamer 1988: 430-433). If there is one goal with this research that would be more important than others, it is to mediate these perspectives, from data collection to data analysis, as undistorted as absolutely possible.

HERMENEUTIC METHODOLOGY
In hermeneutic methodology – a current which has had great influence on the research methods of this paper – two criteria of an optimal interpretation are (i) that it should explain all the data, and (ii) that it should not contradict any of the
data (Kremer 1998). Hence, the general strategy in attempting to reach these two criteria is that:

i) Differences and similarities between the dispute resolution processes of the two cases should be illuminated and sources of legitimacy and illegitimacy should be allocated within them.

ii) Confounding variables such as social characteristics and relationships in the village or economic characteristics of land should be surveyed, making sure that none of them contradict the interpretation made.

In this research approach to legitimacy within dispute resolution, it has been an attempt not to view matters as the normative “right” versus “wrong” or “good” versus “bad”. However, it has been acknowledged that the normative evaluation by involved individuals can reveal depths of understanding which would otherwise be difficult to reach (Gadamer 1988: 431). Hence, it is important to make the distinction between research being normative and research using the normative to form an understanding of a matter.

**PRACTICAL RESEARCH LIMITATIONS**

In regards to research limitations, such are primarily originated from practical circumstances in Uganda. Lack in social capital – a relevant concept in this paper on which Robert Putnam (1993) and Munene et al. (2005) have performed excellent research – makes the already tender subject of land disputes even more so. To add to this point, there are many actors who would prefer it if the justice made would never be investigated further, giving room for corruption to tear the research undertaken. These matters, alongside the general security situation in Uganda, leave personal relations probably as the most viable way of gaining access to a peripheral community.

This has in every way been true for the field research presented in this paper and one aspect which has naturally been heavily affected thereby is the research selection, being the choice to study Kacerere and to leave other peripheral communities, even if it could have contributed to a ‘broader picture’. Hence, it is safe to say that this single paper will in no way drain the matter of resource
distribution and political formation in Uganda, but it rather presents an insight to its processes on a micro level in a single community.

THE IAD-FRAMEWORK AT A GLANCE
To study a dispute resolution process is basically to study institutions in practice. In this study, the Institutional Analysis and Development framework – commonly referred to as the IAD-framework – was chosen for this purpose. It was chosen before other theoretical frameworks partly because of its strengths in organizing complex relations of many variables, hence making it a rather flexible theoretical and methodological framework, and partly because of its extensive previous use within research regarding resource management (Ostrom 2005: 9).

DATA COLLECTION
The empirical material presented in this paper was gathered through a process of qualitative data collection in November and December 2007. Two cases of land dispute were chosen in consultation with the villagers during a meeting open for any villager willing to take part. Most adult villagers – women and men – did indeed take part and an ‘order of the free word’ was actively practiced. Land disputes were chosen specifically in order to make the research revolve around the most precious resource in this farming community, and these two specific cases were chosen primarily on the criteria of availability granted by the dispute owners. The methods used in the research were a merge of three qualitative methods, being participatory observation, focus group interviews and personal interviews. While focus was on the lastly mentioned, each one of the three methods had a distinct purpose of bridging weaknesses in the other two.

The greatest advantage of the participatory observation in the data collection was doubtlessly the possibility to penetrate deeper into the concept of land, and to access different perspectives on matters of land dispute resolution in the local tradition. This was in a sense unavoidable, since the research had its base of operation within the village. The role of the researcher was largely the one of the ‘observer-as-participant’, where the research was always of primary concern
As important as the participatory observation was to the data collection, it was performed during a relatively short period of time. Hence, no state of ‘saturation’ was reached (ibid. 303). Nor was the local language learned to any larger extent, but to some degree the philosophy of the villagers was and also the symbolism related to land ownership.

Access to Kacerere village was first made through personal relations to one of the villagers, who later came to be a key informant. The research selection was further made through ‘snowballing’ from interviews with the dispute owners (Bryman 2001: 323-325). The interviews performed were semi-structured on the basis of the IAD-framework (Appendix D). However, the informants were allowed practically any digression they initiated, since these could often be tied back to the matters of focal interest in new perspectives. Furthermore, the informants were asked to describe themselves in aspects of belonging and social relations. In contrast to the participatory observation, the interviews could focus on the specific disputes of interest in a much better way. All and all there were three interviews – one with each dispute owner – and each interview was momentarily recorded on tape. The duration of each interview was between one hour and one hour and a half, and after all empirical information had been gathered the three informants confirmed its correctness and gave their consent to using it.

Individuals who were not dispute owners, but had participated in the dispute resolution process were assembled into two separate focus group interviews, one for each case. The choice to form focus groups of the individuals involved in the dispute resolutions was primarily an attempt to replicate the situation they had been in during the process of resolving the disputes. This was complicated by the fact that some individuals who had participated during the land dispute resolutions had passed away by the time of the data collection, leading to group sizes of three individuals in each group. The focus group interviews were, in similarity to the personal interviews, guided by the IAD-framework as well as the confirmation of matters revealed during the interviews. Tests were performed with unstructured focus group discussions as well as with different settings, but the language barrier
then constituted too much of a practical problem, why the present form was chosen.

DATA ANALYSIS
The data analysis was performed in two stages – a primary and a secondary analysis – as an attempt to mend the practical gaps between the tools of analysis. While the primary analysis focused on the IAD-framework, the secondary analysis of legitimacy has come to constitute the focal one for this paper. Both stages of analysis were pervaded with the qualitative research strategies of ‘grounded theory’, in which the theories in use were applied out of the empirical reality observed (Bryman 2001: 390-398). Hence, the process of analysis was taking place along sides the data collection.

The primary analysis – using the IAD-framework – was initiated already during the field research, narrowing down the focal point of the research towards the legitimacy of the dispute resolutions. After the conclusion of the field research, a period of time was allowed to pass before the secondary analysis. This was done partially by practical reasons and partially as a precaution against ‘going native’ (ibid. 300). The secondary analysis of the data – focusing legitimacy – was performed in connection to the process of writing this paper. Less attention was in this later stage given to the hermeneutical understanding, while more attention was given to the theoretical connection of the data.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL VALIDITY
As ever so often is the case with qualitative research, the confounding variables of the causal relations focused herein are rather complementary than alternative. However, one of the major issues regarding the internal validity of the research behind this paper would certainly be maturation. All accounts given from respondents relate to events which occurred decades ago, and it is certainly possible – or even plausible – that different understandings of them have changed along the path of time. However, it is important to note that the process of social action is not often exclusively contained to the arena on which it primarily takes
place (Goffman 1959). How the farmers of Kacerere chose to relate to the two land disputes and dispute resolution processes after their conclusion is as important as – if not even more important than – the developments during the actual disputes.

Regarding the external validity of the findings presented in this paper, it is necessary to remember that it is a qualitative micro-analysis. The theoretical advances made in this paper should hold relatively high transferability to similar societies, but at the same time it is important to note that very little is known about the culture of the people living in Kacerere. It is an ever burning question how much we can assume about the similarities between societies in these relatively unknown regions of the world but given the evaluation that none of the known confounding variables in the research contradicted the explanation provided, assuming problems of transferability is probably uncalled for. Further evaluation can hopefully be provided through tests of hypothesizes generated through this research.
Theoretical foundation

As previously mentioned, the analysis presented in this paper is composed out of a primary and a secondary analysis. As a theoretical foundation for the primary analysis a categorization of institutional rules within the IAD-framework is allocated, and for the secondary analysis theory of the legitimacy of power is used. This chapter will account for these components in the foundation of the analysis in an attempt to anchor them in a larger scientific context.

Institutional diversity

During the last few decades, political science – like most social sciences – have leaned more and more towards institutional aspects of society. This have been a part of what is sometimes referred to as the neo-institutional boom, which fundamentally stirred around concepts and ideas until institutions could refer to a multitude of social phenomenon (Peters 2005: 1-23). Hence, a specification of how concepts are perceived and used is probably needed, why this will be done in this section.

INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS

In many respects thanks to the work of Douglass C. North (1990) a common ground has been to some extent restored within the field of institutional theory. This foundation is also holding up much of the institutional analysis presented in this paper, Hence, there is reason to account for it a bit more thoroughly. The main conceptual advances made by North are three. Firstly, institutions are defined as the humanly devised constraints which shape human interaction within a society and provide stability to its members (ibid. 3). Secondly, institutions are not only formal – such as laws and outspoken rules – but also include informal ones (ibid. 36-53). Examples of such informal institutions are social norms, values and beliefs. Thirdly, but in many ways primarily, North makes a conceptual difference between institutions and organizations (ibid. 7). One of the great conceptual problems within institutional research since the neo-institutional boom
have been that the term ‘institution’ could refer to both organizations – such as governmental authorities – and the constraints North intends. He suggests that organizations are not institutions, even if institutions are found within them as well as forming characteristics of organizations. In regards to the how institutions inter-relate with their context, one set of answers is found within the IAD-framework.

THE IAD-FRAMEWORK IN DETAIL

![The IAD-framework conceptual map (acquired from Ostrom 2005: 15).](image)

In the previous chapter the IAD-framework was presented at a glance, and this is the time to indulge in a closer review. The IAD-framework – illustrated in Figure 2 – is focused around the action arena, being the scenario of participants in action situations forming interaction (Ostrom 2005: 32-68). As illustrated, the action arena is a result of exogenous variables just like the outcomes of the action arena will result in a change of the exogenous variables, hence forming a spiral of development (Ostrom 2005: 3-31). In specific research purposes – such as the ones presented in this paper – the evaluative criteria would constitute the foundation of analysis.

SEVEN TYPES OF INSTITUTIONAL RULES

Most of the theoretical base of the IAD-framework revolves around the categorisation of the formal and informal constraints in the action arena.
According to Ostrom (2005), there are seven main categories to take into consideration:

- **Position rules** define which positions are available on an action arena and how many participants can fill each position.
- **Boundary rules** define who can or cannot enter or leave a specific position on the action arena, how and under which circumstances.
- **Aggregation rules** define how action and interaction take form in the action arena and if there are any key-positions or key-participants.
- **Choice rules** define which actions a participant in a position is entitled, obligated or forbidden to take.
- **Information rules** define channels, flow and subjects of communication on the action arena.
- **Payoff rules** define the rewards and losses at stake for different positions or participants on the action arena.
- **Scope rules** define the context affecting and affected by the potential outcome (Ostrom 2005: 193-211).

**ACTION ARENAS AND INTERACTIONS**

Due to the fact that the link between action arenas and interaction are of special interest in this paper, and since the two concepts may easily be confused, a few words should be devoted to this matter of importance. On the action arena, individual participants act on the specific action situations they are confronted with, hence forming interaction which might in turn affect their actions on the action arena (Ostrom 2005: 45-50). In the cases presented in this paper, for example, the dispute resolution process was formed through decisions by the dispute owners to handle the land disputes in a way that formed interaction. This interaction in turn effected their actions regarding the land dispute – for example bringing more participants into the action arena – hence forming new interaction which in the end led to a certain set of outcomes. It might then be fruitful to keep the distinction between the interaction and the action arena in mind, maintaining an awareness of the individual space of action and the collective one.
Legitimation of power

Regarding the focal point of analysis in this paper, which is the legitimacy of power, there are many perceptions of what legitimacy actually is and how it should be evaluated. This would largely be so because legitimacy is in every way a concept very dependent on the context in which it is used. Therefore, the following pages will be devoted to rooting the concept of legitimacy applied by David Beetham in an overall approach to politics of resource distribution.

WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, HOW

Harold D. Lasswell (1958) argued that politics originate in the distribution of limited resources. Those in a society who can acquire more of these resources than the ‘mass’ forms ‘elite’, which use different elements of politics to maintain and strengthen their position. Hence, he argues that the study of political behaviour should focus on the elite (Lasswell 1958: 13-27). Even the political action undertaken within the mass is done so in some form of relations to the elite. An attempt by an actor within the mass to oppose the elite is so, just as much as an attempt to reach the position of elite. Through this idea, Lasswell conceptualized politics as the study of ‘who gets what, when, how’, five words which also constituted the title of one of his most recognised publications. Through this work he also conceptualized the elements of political action as politics of violence, goods, symbols and practices (ibid. 31-94).

LEGITIMACY AND ILLEGITIMACY

In accordance with Lasswell’s idea about different elements of politics, David Beetham argues that there has to be more than just raw power to the actions taken by the elite, then referred to as authority (Beetham 1991: 42-63). Elite – such as a government or an individual who controls a precious resource – has to be tied to some basic rules for the mass to accept the uneven distribution of power. According to Beetham, this – the ‘legitimation of power’ – has three dimension illustrated in Table 1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria of legitimacy</th>
<th>Form of non-legitimate power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i) Conformity to rules (legal validity)</td>
<td>Illegitimacy (breach of rules)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii) Justifiability of rules in terms of shared beliefs</td>
<td>Legitimacy deficit (discrepancy between rules and supporting beliefs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii) Legitimation through expressed consent</td>
<td>Delegitimation (withdrawal of consent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Three dimensions of legitimacy (acquired from Beetham 1991: 20)

In each one of these dimensions there could be sources of legitimacy or illegitimacy, which would in turn affect the power of the elite exercising power. The legal dimension (i) primarily revolves around the practices of the elite and whether they are in line with the rules supposedly founded in the moral dimension (Beetham 1991: 16). The moral dimension (ii) constitutes the foundation for the rules in use, connecting them to shared values of the society (ibid. 17-18). The public dimension (iii), lastly, switches focus from the elite to the mass and how they relate to the practices of the elite (ibid. 18-19).

Operationalization

As for the introduction to the IAD-framework previously presented, the real value of the analytical framework shows when it is filled with the variables introduced in the beginning of this paper. This is done in Figure 3, outlining the operationalization of the research approach.

The exogenous variables forming the background of land dispute are generally the same between the two cases focused in this paper. Land is limited in the village and there are many villagers to feed, forming a resource scarcity through the basic
functions of microeconomy. Strongly effecting the distribution of this scarce resource are the institutions of land ownership, creating conditions of normality as well as normality breach in the resource distribution. The political context of Kacerere meets these conditions with the possibility for two farmers to engage into a dispute, leading the dispute owners and eventually other individuals into the action arena of the land dispute as participants. Through the dispute resolution process a ruling for the resource distribution was produced but also, presumably, a social outcome in the form of legitimacy for those involved.

In this paper, the relationship between those two variables – the dispute resolution process and the legitimacy – will be evaluated through the theory of legitimacy previously presented. The legitimacy analysis is in every way dependent on the results of the institutional analysis, since this one will reveal the ‘rules’ that any legitimacy and illegitimacy relates to. Apart from this, it is also necessary to allocate authorities and actors attempting authoritative action, since these are in essence the participants on the action arena.
Two cases of land dispute resolution

As previously mentioned, Kacerere is a refined farmers’ society. Agriculture is without doubt the primary livelihood, even if the use of land is much more diverse than just that. One of these farmers in Kacerere is "Voitto", a grandson of one of the men who founded the village and a central individual both in the village and in this research. Through two cases of land dispute concerning "Voitto" and his fellow villagers, this chapter will attempt to provide an insight to how disputes concerning land – as well as their aftermaths – are handled in Kacerere.

Administration and practices concerning land

In order to understand the two cases of land dispute in Kacerere it is necessary to have some basic understanding of the context in which they took place and were resolved. This would best be done by recalling circumstances from the time around the 1980s, when the two land disputes took place. The following pages are attempted to account for the legal and administrative system of Uganda at that time as well as the social setting of Kacerere village.

AN ATTEMPT TO BRING THE STATE TO THE VILLAGE

Different forms of decentralization have been attempted in Uganda, since the days of colonization (Karugire 1980: 110) up until the current governmental administration (MOLG 2006). During the time of the focused land disputes, Uganda was a rather questionable democracy, during which several attempts to gain more power over peripheral regions were made. This is actually one of the reasons why the villagers – who are even uncertain of their own birthdates – can pin down the time of the disputes. They simply remember which administrative system was used to solve the disputes, and through that they can make a reasonably fair estimation of time.

The administrative system during the disputes was in a period of crisis, as one set of governments were changed for another during a time period of seven years.
First, Idi Amin was replaced by Milton Obote, who was in turn removed by Tito Okello, who was in turn overthrown by the National Resistance Army, which later became the National Resistance Movement and the current government (Nsibambi 2000: 14-15). However, regarding the resolution of land disputes the administrative system has changed very little. The accounts given by the villagers concern processes on three different levels of authority, which can still be found organized in a similar fashion (Appendix A):

- **The village** as a social unit with non-governmental authorities.
- **The mayumba** being the lowest level of governmental authority.
- **The county court** being the intermediate level between local and district level.

**THE COMMUNITY OF KACERERE**

In the village of Kacerere five generations had passed at the time of the disputes, and all of the central individuals in the two disputes are descendants to “Ismo”, one of the two men who founded the village (Appendix C). In both disputes, “Voitto” was involved as a land owner, and he ultimately won both of them. By now it should be noted that all individuals are referred to by fictive names. In the first dispute to be reviewed, ”Voitto” was opposed by ”Launo” and in the dispute resolution ”Kaapo” and ”Usko” took part. The other dispute was between ”Voitto” and his stepbrother ”Risto”, and among the men in the village who tried to resolve it was ”Niilo” and ”Mainio”. ”Voitto” and ”Risto” had the same father but ”Voitto’s” mother “Pilvi” was “Aapo’s” first wife, while ”Risto’s” mother “Oili” was the second, as arranged in polygamic marriage.

After looking at the family tree of ”Ismo” and his descendants (Appendix C), it comes as no surprise that land is a scarce resource in Kacerere. There are three ways of acquiring land in the village, by purchase, heritage or gift. Traditionally only men possess the economic means to purchase land. Inherited land goes from the father to his son/sons. If a woman would in some way acquire a piece of land, her husband, father or son/sons would traditionally administrate it for her, meaning that land in Kacerere is a resource which is primarily controlled by men. Today governmental gender policies have interfered with these traditions and it is
possible for a woman to own land (MOGACD 1997), but it is still not very common and at the time of the disputes none of these policies had been issued.

The actual importance of land in Kacerere can not easily be exaggerated, a fact which Grace Carswell argues to be a general characteristic of the region in which Kacerere is situated (Carswell 2007). It is the main livelihood of almost every family in the village, and apart from the crops the people grow they also use the land for house building, forestry and to keep cattle. This means that loosing ones land is a great poverty carrier, and gaining more land also builds political power through the ability to pay for education, food and the necessary briberies to make your will count, for example in a land dispute. If you do not have money you can still live and be prosperous in Kacerere, but if you have money but no land you are in a bad situation since you can not buy everything you need to make a healthy living, except land of course. Land is as close as you come to strong currency in Kacerere, and that is why land disputes are such important action arenas.

**HOW LAND DISPUTES ARE HANDLED**

The land resources of a farmer in Kacerere are seldom one unified slot, but rather a multitude of scattered ones. Hence, land disputes are common but usually last a rather short time. Practically all villagers have had a land dispute of some sort with someone at some time, but grudges because of land are usually as short lasting as the dispute itself. This provokes the question of how land disputes are handled in Kacerere. The foundation of dispute resolution, in the traditional form, is the aim of reaching mutual understanding. This might be difficult at times, since there is no formal documentation of which slot of land belongs to whom, apart from occasional demarcations.

The typical land dispute in the village starts at this flaw. Lacking demarcations and problems of initial land distribution makes out the grounds for two or more individuals to enter into a dispute. They then go to the disputed land and try to reason about it. Often the dispute ends here, as they reach an agreement, but other times they can not manage to do this. Then the next step is to call in a dispute resolution group, composed by elders and trusted men. The procedure is then
repeated, as the dispute owners and the dispute resolution group heads out to the disputed land and tries to reason. Since there is no formal documentation of land ownership, everybody knows which land belongs to whom. Hence, the dispute resolution group can make a decision based on their knowledge and wisdom. The demarcation is then improved in order to avoid further dispute.

Examples from two resolved disputes

With the background information presented in the previous section, the following pages constitute the presentation of the two separate land disputes and the connected dispute resolution processes. This is meant to provide an overview in the empirical differences between the ideal dispute resolution and the less than ideal one. The empirical examples about to be accounted for are recollections made by the previously introduced villagers of Kacerere.

THE "GOOD" DISPUTE RESOLUTION

The first land dispute of this study – illustrated in Figure 4 – is one that most of the involved individuals refer to as a dispute with a good resolution. The dispute concerned the borders between a field belonging to "Voitto" and one belonging to "Launo" in an area called Kirwa Muruhanga. The problem started when "Launo" broke the boundaries of his field and started using land belonging to "Voitto", who then started the dispute. Within a week, a dispute resolution group of men from the village were gathered by the two. The brothers "Aulis" and "Usko" were part of the group, which soon decided to the advantage of "Voitto". As the traditions bid, the demarcations were enhanced to avoid disputes in the future, and both "Voitto" and "Launo" accepted the results.

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**Figure 4: The land dispute of Kirwa Muruhanga.**
THE "BAD" DISPUTE RESOLUTION

The second land dispute reviewed in this paper – illustrated in Figure 5 – is a much more complicated one, even though the similarities are many, and most of the involved individuals refer to the dispute as a badly resolved one. The problem originated when the two stepbrothers "Voitto" and "Risto" was to inherit their fathers land through their separate mothers. "Voitto" argued that one field – called Nyarurambi-Kikonokwa – was his to inherit, and "Risto" disagreed. A dispute resolution group was formed, and a decision was reached to the advantage of "Voitto". "Risto" disagreed and took the dispute to mayumba, which favoured the decision from the dispute resolution group, so "Risto" took the matter to the county court where "Voitto" finally won. "Risto" was not satisfied but he claims that he did not have the money to win the case, suggesting corruption in the dispute resolution process.

![Diagram of dispute resolution process]

Figure 5: The land dispute of Nyarurambi-Kikonokwa.

What has happened since the disputes

The recollections from the two land disputes seem to contain distinct differences in the dispute resolution processes. However, that is not the end of the matter as there might be several confounding variables still hidden in the happenings concerning the cases. Hence, it is necessary to know how Kacerere village has changed since the disputes were resolved and perhaps even more so how the lives of the involved villagers have developed over the years. The following pages constitute the villagers’ accounts of developments after the two land disputes had been resolved.
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS
Since the National Resistance Movement came into governmental position, a lot has changed in Uganda and a new decentralization policy was issued in 1992 (MOLG 2006). This policy is a partial solution for democratization and implementation of good governance in a country with strong roots of traditional authority, and it has rebuilt the local administration around so-called ‘Local Councils’ (Appendix B). However, the process of resolving land disputes is essentially the same as it used to be (Appendix A).

THE SOCIAL UNIT OF THE VILLAGE
If the decentralization previously described is considered as administrative reforms, there should also be an awareness of the development in Kacerere village itself. In the late 1970s a group – the Kirwa Ngozi group – was formed in the village. The official purpose of the group has been to provide help to old and sick people, to orphans and in case of death, but in reality the group have been organizing the main functions of the village, including infrastructural construction and repairs, social and economical security. The group is described to have gradually overtaken the traditional role of the village as a social unit. Though the benefits of the group are only available to the members, and not everybody can afford the annual membership fee. There are even some people claiming that they have been refused membership despite being prepared to pay the fee.

LIFE FOR THE INVOLVED INDIVIDUALS
"Voitto" is today a vice chairman in the Kirwa Ngozi group, and "Launo" describes himself as an active member. "Risto", however, left the group during the dispute with his stepbrother and has not been a member since. He says the land dispute was devastating for his economical and social situation, and because of that he can not afford membership in the group. "Voitto" has no intention of hiding that the resolution of the two land disputes had a big role to play in putting him where he is today. Through the crops of the land he gained in the disputes he has been able to support all his children with good education and today many people consider him a factor of power in the village. "Launo" has also had success
in some social aspects, and his fellow villagers describe him as a trustworthy man, but it is known in the village that he has had to work very hard to get to where he is today.
Analysis and discussion

Through the theories previously accounted for, this chapter will present an analysis of the empirical material from Kacerere. A primary analysis, focusing the institutional framework applied in land disputes, will first be laid as a foundation for a secondary analysis regarding the focal matter of legitimacy. Lastly, the results of this analysis will be further discussed on more hypothetical terms to inspire further research.

Institutional analysis

As accounted for in the methodological section of this paper, one of the steps towards explanatory capacity has to be the selection of differences and similarities between the two dispute resolution processes focused. In order for this selection not to be arbitrary, an institutional analysis will be performed in accordance to the foundation of analysis presented in the first part of the theoretical chapter. In the pages to follow, the empirical material collected will be categorized according to seven types of rules, hence providing structured accounts of differences and similarities between the two dispute resolution processes.

POSITION RULES

The position rules changed as follows during the process:

1) In the origin of both disputes there were two positions, one for each dispute owner. Hypothetically speaking, there could have been several opponents in the disputes, but such action arenas are very rare in Kacerere.

2) According to tradition, the positions were expanded to a dispute resolution group since the dispute owners in each dispute could not reach an agreement by themselves.

3) In the Nyarurambi-Kikonokwa dispute of "Voitto" versus "Risto", the positions were expanded two more times, first to the mayumba and later to the county court.
BOUNDARY RULES
When it came to the dispute owners, they could leave the dispute whenever they would have decided to give up the land, but the situation was not quite as simple for the individuals in the dispute resolution groups. They had been handpicked by the dispute owners, and they were obligated to see it through. They could, however, under certain circumstances have been excluded for misconduct. Exactly what ‘misconduct’ could mean in the situation would have been settled within the dispute resolution group. The members of the dispute resolution group were traditionally chosen from the elders and from the trustworthy men in the village, as it is customary to listen to these men. The mayumba and the county court were governmental functions where the conditions were set within the governmental administration.

AGGREGATION RULES
In the land disputes presented in this paper, key-positions were allocated with the dispute owners. The dispute resolution groups were put together as a reflection of the social hierarchy in Kacerere. The function of the dispute resolution groups was to form equality between the dispute owners, by taking a superior position to them both. The elders and the trustworthy men – who possessed a high social status – had more authority in a dispute resolution process. If two individuals in a dispute resolution group would have been of equal social status, the one above them in the hierarchy would naturally bring stability since this individual could actually have ruled the process on his own if he would have chosen to. If there would have been two equals in the top of the hierarchy, they would have been trusted to work in mutual understanding with each other.

CHOICE RULES
In Kacerere there were two aspects of the dispute processes, the formal and the informal ones. The formal aspect would allow the dispute owners to resolve the dispute whenever they would have liked to, and on equal terms. This was the ideal, which dispute resolution groups in both cases worked towards. In the informal aspect, however, a dispute process could have included bribery, verbal
persuasion and other means of getting ones way that would formally be considered against the rules. The further the process went, the more informal rules played in to the process. According to villagers this was because the Ugandan government was corrupt, and the further from the village a dispute was taken, the more individuals would have wanted a part of the resources on stake. That means that more of the informal rules would be used on those stages of dispute.

**INFORMATION RULES**
At some point during the dispute resolution processes, information as well as means of action changed dramatically. After this point the village was no longer the highest authority, and in the "bad" dispute resolution the statements of the involved individuals differed more and more after it. Apart from this, the administration of the case would no longer be configured for solutions of mutual understanding. The choices of the individuals in the dispute resolution group as well as the dispute owners got limited to information power.

**PAYOFF RULES**
Up until the mayumba, the only ones with any material resources at stake were the dispute owners. That was a function to keep the dispute resolution fair and on equal terms, but in the mayumba as well as the court that was no longer an option because of the suggested corruption in the governmental administration.

**SCOPE RULES**
The scope rules are perhaps the best summary one could hope for in this institutional analysis. The "good" dispute resolution was resolved at village level, while the "bad" one went on to the governmentally administered level. In essence, the difference between these two levels is administrational culture, rooted in the cultural values they represent. While the traditional authority within the village represents the people of the village, the governmental authorities would in the best sense represent the people of Uganda, including the village.
This gap exemplifies one of the fundamental problems in building a nation. Should the people of Kacerere be ruled by their own authorities or should they be ruled by the national authorities of Uganda. If one would prefer the latter alternative, which is a prerequisite if Uganda is to be considered as one unified nation, this would not mean that social mechanisms on village level – such as legitimacy – would be taken out of play. As the legitimacy analysis will reveal, the social evaluation of actions taken within the dispute resolution process was constantly interacting with the process. It shaped the courses of action while it was formed through action.

**Legitimacy analysis**

According to the institutional analysis just presented, massive weight is allocated to "Risto’s” decision to take the land dispute to the governmental authorities for them to resolve it, and to ”Launo’s” contrasting decision in the corresponding situation. Hence, less attention will now be directed towards the governmental and traditional authorities as well as the dispute resolution process itself, while the legitimacy of decisions taken by the less fortunate dispute owners will be focused. This in order to illuminate the connection between differences in the dispute resolution processes and assumed differences in legitimacy.

**PUBLIC DIMENSION**

In this dimension of legitimacy the aggregation rules play a very important role. Through the decision to gather a dispute resolution group, the dispute owners themselves decided to reduce their influence over the dispute resolution by investing it in the trusted individuals of the community. Hence, the dispute resolution group was the community represented in the dispute resolution process. Having their liking would be to have the liking of the community, and going against their will would also be to go against the will of the community.

In the "good” *Kirwa Muruhanga* dispute, ”Launo” accepted the decision made by the dispute resolution group and admitted that he was wrong, meaning that he
went in line with the consent of the community. Through this, "Launo" could actually have gained legitimacy as an authority in the eyes of his fellow villagers, which would also be a partial explanation for his current position as a trustworthy man in the community.

In the "bad" Nyarurambi-Kikonokwa dispute, "Risto" did not accept the rulings made by the dispute resolution group. He took the dispute to the governmental authorities, clearly questioning the rulings within the village, and lost the consent of the community. Through this, "Risto" would probably also have lost the legitimacy for his influence over his dispute cause. A fact that strengthens this reasoning is that most villagers who participated in the dispute resolution of the governmental authorities spoke in favour of "Voitto". "Risto" had lost any favour of his community that he might ones have had.

LEGAL DIMENSION
So, what drove "Risto" to challenge the rule of the authority of the dispute resolution group and its decisions, while "Launo" at ones accepted the defeat and subjected himself to the justice made? According to "Launo" himself, he understood during the dispute resolution process that he had been wrong about his claims for the land. "Risto", on his side, is still convinced that he has rights to the land in question but that he does not have the means to pursue it. These statements combined with the set of choice rules might help explain their actions.

There are, as previously accounted for, formal and informal rules in a dispute resolution process. The formal ones are those within the framework of the traditional dispute resolution, focusing on mutual understanding and equal opportunities. If these formal rules would be followed, and if the decision by the dispute resolution group would be accepted by both dispute owners, there would be no need for governmental authorities. However, the governmental authorities at this time had a conflicting perspective on the matter. From a governmental perspective, all traditional power had to be rooted in and exercised within the framework of the governmental authorities. The government would always be a legitimate authority, even as the suggested corruption contradicted this.
Hence, from a larger perspective, "Risto" and "Launo" were in a much more complicated situation than the community wanted them to think. They had two institutional frameworks to consider. The dispute resolution group claimed supreme authority on traditional grounds, and the government claimed supreme authority on legal as well as bureaucratic grounds. Both of the less fortunate dispute owners had two institutional frameworks to exploit, but only "Risto" chose to do so. However, this choice turned out as a breach of rules in regards to the dispute resolution group and the traditional authorities of the community, leading to further loss of favor regarding legitimacy.

**MORAL DIMENSION**

Concluding the two previous dimensions of legitimacy, "Risto’s" choices illegitimized his attempted authority over the dispute resolution process in three steps:

1) "Risto” refused "Voitto” the rights to the land in question, hence forming a dispute which could have been avoided.
2) "Risto” and "Voitto” both chose to give the authority to decide over the dispute to the community through the dispute resolution group.
3) "Risto” failed to honor this choice, as he turned to a rivalry authority to overrule the decisions by the dispute resolution group.

Perhaps these choices could have lead to other consequences if "Risto” had won the dispute on any of the governmental levels, but he did not. This left him without rights regarding the land and ill seen by his fellow villagers, but what moral beliefs had he defied? Based on the three steps above, a hypothetical moral code can be phrased as follows: A member of the community engaging in a dispute and deciding to invest his influence over this dispute to the traditional authorities, should also accept the decisions by this authority and not seek to override it through other authorities. "Launo” subjected himself to this moral code as he accepted the results and even changed his mind to thinking he had never had any rights to the land in question, while "Risto” did not subject himself to the moral code in any of its aspects.
Discussion

Even though the analysis is pointing in one rather strong direction – suggesting quite conclusive results – it might be fruitful to take matters further into discussion. Partly in order to develop the reasoning previously accounted for, and partly in order to strengthen it, the following pages will broaden the perspective somewhat.

CONFOUNDING VARIABLES

Based on the theoretical and empirical material presented herein, it is reasonable to reach the results accounted for in the analysis, but it is another thing to actually validate them. In the methodological section of this paper, one of the mentioned criteria of interpretation required the detection of confounding variables. The following four points could constitute such variables, perhaps shedding another light on the results of the previous analysis:

- **Family dispute:** A difference previously unexplored between the "good" and the "bad" dispute is that "Risto" is "Voitto’s" stepbrother, while "Launo" is not. There is a possibility that "Voitto" and "Risto" has a family grudge, and since "Voitto" is a central member in the *Kirwa Ngozi* group this could explain "Risto’s" non-membership as well as the dramatic solution to the land dispute, even if both of the brothers claim that this is not the case.

- **Personal attributes:** Several informants in the study have made statements about "Risto’s" personal attributes, suggesting deviation from the norm concerning his living and mental health. Some consider him a lunatic, some a drunkard. This may or may not be true, but it is a possible alternative explanation to "Risto’s" assumed exclusion from the group.

- **Economic circumstances:** It’s a fact that different slots of land have different properties, which may also cause economic differences between the dispute matters in the "good" and "bad" disputes respectively. If this would be the case, which there is currently no data validating, it is also possible that it would affect the turns taken during the dispute resolution process.

- **Group membership:** One remarkable detail about the disputes and their solution is that the majority of people involved in them are members of the
Kirwa Ngozi group, excepts from "Risto" of course. It could be that group membership promotes good solutions to disputes, but it is hard to prove since the group has grown into the community slowly, and at the time of the disputes the group did not have the same members as it has today.

None of these confounding variables can be completely dismissed, nor completely confirmed. In an assumption that human action is based on dynamic balances of different factors it could also be assumed that all, several or some of these are complementary to the explanation focused in this paper, rather than alternative (Weber 1964: 3-40).

ANALYSIS RESULTS
Through the institutional analysis, the rules of the dispute resolution processes were structured into seven categories, revealing differences between the two cases focused in this paper. The major differences were allocated to aggregation rules and choice rules, but were supported by practically all other categories. In the legitimacy analysis, great weight was given to the difference that the "bad" dispute had been taken to the governmental authorities, hence overriding the traditional ones, while the "good" one had been ultimately resolved by the traditional authorities. It should be clear by now that this choice caused illegitimacy in practically all dimensions within the analysis, and the analysis result is in its essence telling us about the assumed connection between the dispute resolution processes and aspects of legitimacy, in a sense confirming the interpretation presented in the aim of this paper. Regarding the question of how this happened, a hypothesis of a moral code preventing the traditional authorities from being overridden by other authorities – such as governmental ones – can be formed for the sake of inspiration and discussion.

THE HYPOTHESIS OF A META-NORM
In the context of the Nyarurambi-Kikonokwa dispute, where the breach of the hypothetical moral code caused social sanctions for the individual of misconduct, grounds are good to assume that the moral code would be enforced through a
social norm (Axelrod 1986). More specifically, this would be a so called ‘meta-norm’, as conceptualized by Robert Axelrod. The function of a meta-norm – or especially the one dealt with here – is to maintain the institutional framework of dispute resolution within the community and through this to promote the traditional authorities from rivalry ones and conflicting institutional frameworks. It is, if you will, a type of ‘no-gods-but-me rule’.

BEHAVIORAL POVERTY
The hypothesis of a meta-norm is a rather inspiring one, and one which in this context is quite right in time. For long, the phenomenon of poverty and social exclusion have been known and studied in societies of sub-Saharan Africa, but not until lately have the connection between them been of focal interest. The concept of ‘behavioral poverty’ is one fruit of these later studies, as it explains a lot of the poverty in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of social capital (Munene et al. 2005). This rhymes well with the legitimacy theme of this paper, since Beetham argues that the major result of lacking legitimacy is lacking trust within the concerned society (Beetham 1991: 25-37).

SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED
Even if one was not to accept the hypothetical involvement of a meta-norm, there is much to learn from the results presented in this paper. In administering the resolution of local disputes in a young nation such as Uganda, it is important to recognize the role of local authorities. On the same point, it is important to recognize that the formal institutions observable in the outspoken rules and procedures of such a process is also accompanied by informal institutions of social norms, values and beliefs. The results presented in this paper show that in a long-term perspective a local level dispute resolution can bring positive results for both dispute owners, because the less fortunate dispute owner who accepts responsibility can gain respect in the community. Furthermore, the examples show that while governmental authorities can effectively override the local authorities regarding formal institutions and decisions, there is less success to be made in
blocking the impact of informal institutions. They are in a sense brought into the action arena with the participants.

A positive twist to these issues is that the governmental administration of Uganda really has learned their lesson since the time of the exemplified disputes in Kacerere. A comprehensive process of decentralization has been initiated, and the governmental authorities dealing with land dispute resolution make extensive use of the traditional authorities in their work (Appendix A). Still, land continues to be a tender subject in Uganda, and in this fertile region it constitutes one of the most inflamed political issues of post-colonial times.
References

LITERATURE


**OTHER PRINTED MATERIAL**

WWW-DOCUMENTS

Yahoo. (25 DEC 2007). Figure 1: Map of Kacerere and its location in Uganda. [images].

URL 1: http://travel.yahoo.com/p-map-489470-map_of_kabale-i

INTERVIEWS

I-1, "Voitto" (fictive name): Dispute owner in the Kirwa Muruhanga dispute as well as the Nyarurambi-Kikonokwa dispute. (1 DEC 2007).

I-2, "Launo" (fictive name): Dispute owner in the Kirwa Muruhanga dispute. (4 DEC 2007).

I-3, "Risto" (fictive name): Dispute owner in the Nyarurambi-Kikonokwa dispute. (6 DEC 2007).

FOCUS GROUPS

FG-1, Village meeting within the framework of the Kirwa Ngozi group, open for any villager to participate. (29 NOV 2007).

FG-2, Focal discussion for individuals involved in the resolution of the Kirwa Muruhanga dispute. (4 DEC 2007).

FG-3, Focal discussion for individuals involved in the resolution of the Nyarurambi-Kikonokwa dispute. (6 DEC 2007).
Appendix A

Description: Dispute resolution poster (MOWLAЕ).
## Appendix B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functions</th>
<th>Local councils</th>
<th>Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local government</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Exercise all political and executive powers</td>
<td>LC5</td>
<td>District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide services</td>
<td></td>
<td>Composed of 3–5 counties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ensure implementation of government policy and compliance with it</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Plan for the district</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Enact district laws</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monitor performance of government employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Levy, charge, and collect fees and taxes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Formulate, approve, and execute district budgets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administrative unit</strong></td>
<td>LC4</td>
<td>County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Advise district officers and area member of parliament</td>
<td></td>
<td>Composed of 3–5 subcounties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Resolve problems and disputes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monitor delivery of services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local government</strong></td>
<td>LC3</td>
<td>Subcounty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Enact by-laws</td>
<td></td>
<td>Composed of 3–10 parishes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Approve subcounty budget</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monitor performance of government employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Levy, charge, and collect fees and taxes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Formulate, approve, and execute subcounty budgets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administrative unit</strong></td>
<td>LC2</td>
<td>Parish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assist in maintaining law, order, and security</td>
<td></td>
<td>Composed of 3–10 villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Initiate, encourage, support, and participate in self-help projects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Serve as communication channel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monitor the administration and projects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administrative unit</strong></td>
<td>LC1</td>
<td>Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assist in maintaining law, order, and security</td>
<td></td>
<td>Composed of 5–50 households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Initiate, encourage, support, and participate in self-help projects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Recommend persons for local defence units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Serve as communication channel with government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monitor the administration and projects</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Make by-laws</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Impose service fees</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Description:* Local governance administrative structure (Raussen et al. 2001).
Appendix C

Description: Family tree in Kacerere with fictive names (FG-1).
Appendix D

- What is the importance of land in Kacerere village? **
- Are there any particular problems concerning land in the village? **
- What is your role in Kacerere village? *
- How do you personally identify yourself? *
- Can you tell me about the ... dispute you were involved in? *
- What right did you claim to the land? **
- What right did your opponent claim to the land? **
- How did the dispute start and when? **
- Were there any reasons for the dispute apart from the dispute land? **
- How did you reach a settlement and when? ***
- Who did you trust to solve the dispute and why? ***
- Which results did the settlement bring for you? ****
- How will the results be upheld? ****
- Do you accept the results and why? ****
- If not, what do you intend to do about it? ****
- Could you please show me the dispute land slot? *

* Personal profile / Background information
** Exogenous variables
*** Action arena / Interactions
**** Outcomes / Changes in exogenous variables

Description: Personal interview guide.