Lame, Insane and Depressed
A Corpus-Based Study of Clinical Adjectives and Their Blending Processes

Denise Danielsson

English, bachelor's level
2017

Luleå University of Technology
Department of Arts, Communication and Education
LAME, INSANE AND DEPRESSED:
A CORPUS-BASED STUDY OF CLINICAL ADJECTIVES AND THEIR BLENDING PROCESSES

Denise Danielsson
English C, E0014S
Supervisor: Marie Nordlund
June 9, 2017
Abstract
The study maps different usages of three clinical adjectives: lame, insane and depressed by consulting the Corpus of Online Registers of English, the CORE. The study categorizes the usage with respect to clinical and non-clinical senses of the adjectives. It discusses the different usages of each adjective and what the adjective typically modifies, based on the data in the corpus. Further, the study aims to account for the non-clinical usages with the help of Fauconnier and Turner’s (2002) Conceptual Blending Theory. The study offers blending diagrams of generalized utterances containing one of the adjectives and a common modified. The study concludes that the adjectives are used in non-clinical ways in a majority of the data and that the blending diagrams had restricted function but could account for some parts of the blending process. Finally, the study states that uniting a usage-based approach and a cognitive linguistic approach to linguistic phenomena of this kind is a way to trace nuances in language use that otherwise would pass unnoticed.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Introduction.......................................................................................................................... 1
   1.1 Aim .................................................................................................................................. 1

2 Theoretical background........................................................................................................... 2
   2.1 Cognitive linguistics ....................................................................................................... 2
   2.2 Conceptual Blending Theory ........................................................................................... 3
       2.2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 3
       2.2.2 Blending diagrams ................................................................................................. 5
       2.2.3 Applying Conceptual Blending Theory in linguistic research................................. 7

3 Material and methodology ...................................................................................................... 9
   3.1 Categorization of the data .............................................................................................. 10
   3.2 Construction of the blending diagrams .......................................................................... 10

4 Lame ..................................................................................................................................... 13
   4.1 Usages of lame ............................................................................................................... 13
       4.1.1 The modifyee of clinical lame .................................................................................. 13
       4.1.2 The modifyee of ‘lacking power’ lame .................................................................. 14
       4.1.3 The modifyee of ‘lacking social prestige’ lame ....................................................... 15
   4.2 Lame in the OED ............................................................................................................ 16
   4.3 Blending lame ................................................................................................................ 17
   4.4 Blending “A verbal noun is lame” ................................................................................. 18

5 Insane ................................................................................................................................... 20
   5.1 Usages of insane ............................................................................................................ 20
       5.1.1 The modifyee of clinical insane ............................................................................. 21
       5.1.2 The modifyee of ‘mentally deranged’ insane .......................................................... 21
       5.1.3 The modifyee of ‘stupid’ insane ............................................................................. 22
       5.1.4 The modifyee of ‘extreme’ insane ......................................................................... 23
   5.2 Insane in the OED .......................................................................................................... 24
   5.3 Blending “An inanimate object is insane” .................................................................... 25

6 Depressed .............................................................................................................................. 27
   6.1 Usages of depressed ...................................................................................................... 27
       6.1.1 The modifyee of clinical depressed ........................................................................ 28
       6.1.2 The modifyee of ‘miserable’ depressed ................................................................. 28
       6.1.3 The modifyee of ‘economically challenged’ depressed ......................................... 29
   6.2 Depressed in the OED .................................................................................................. 29
   6.3 Blending “A human is depressed” ............................................................................... 31

7 Discussion .............................................................................................................................. 33

References ................................................................................................................................. 36
**Typographic conventions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame elements</th>
<th>Capitalized: Patient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frames</td>
<td>Small caps in brackets: [COMMERCIAL EVENT]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic forms</td>
<td>Italics: <em>lame</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meanings of linguistic forms</td>
<td>Single inverted commas: ‘lacking power’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphors</td>
<td>Small caps: MORE IS UP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quotations</td>
<td>Double inverted commas: “…”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1 Introduction

Illness has always been a part of human existence and different illnesses have been present over time. Language is filled with words relating to illnesses. The adjectives *lame, insane* and *depressed* are the subjects of this study. These adjectives have, either in the present or past, been used to describe an illness-related condition, in my terminology: a clinical condition. They have this illness-related meaning but also a more general applicability today. The study maps the usages of the adjectives and aims to trace the possible relationship between the clinical condition and the extended usages. The study takes off in a distinction of the usage of the adjectives in a clinical and non-clinical sense where the clinical sense is referring to the clinical condition of lameness, insanity, or depression. The non-clinical uses of the adjectives are the uses that are not referring to a clinical condition and for each adjective the different non-clinical usages have been categorized and discussed.

The study employs data from the CORE, Corpus of Online Registers of English. The instances of the adjectives in the corpus have been analyzed and categorized with respect to in what sense the adjective was used and also what the adjective modified. As a result, what the adjectives modify is also a part of this study and is used to gain an understanding of the differences within and between the non-clinical usages of the adjectives.

A way to understand how humans construct meaning in on-line discourse is by Fauconnier and Turner’s (2002) Conceptual Blending Theory (CBT) and the study uses this theory to attempt to account for the non-clinical usages and their possible connections to a clinical condition. The theory employs blending diagrams as a representation of the cognitive processes underlying meaning construction. In this study, blending diagrams have been constructed for a generalized utterance per adjective. The blending diagrams are constructed on the basis of the corpus data but also from the theoretical framework presented by Fauconnier and Turner, including vital relations and also frames, which have been retrieved from FrameNet.

The study approaches one adjective at the time and first presents the result from the corpus study. The different usages of the adjectives are discussed and then compared to dictionary definitions in the Oxford English Dictionary. The study then presents a blending diagram based on a generalized utterance formed around the adjective and a common modified of the adjective. The blending diagram is also discussed and the different steps of the blending process are accounted for. Finally, the study attempts to account for what nuances of the usage that becomes apparent by employing CBT when approaching these adjectives.

1.1 Aim

The purpose of the essay is to map the different ways in which the adjectives *lame, insane* and *depressed* are used. The study aims to try to understand the usages with the help of Fauconnier and Turner’s Conceptual Blending Theory (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). In that sense the aim of the study is twofold, since it beside the study of the adjectives also examines whether CBT is helpful in the understanding of the adjectives. The questions that the analysis focuses on are:

- To what extent are the adjectives used in a non-clinical way?
• In what non-clinical senses are the adjectives used?
• What is modified by the adjectives in their non-clinical usages?
• How can Conceptual Blending Theory account for the extended usages of the adjectives?

2 Theoretical background

2.1 Cognitive linguistics

The study has built upon a cognitive linguistic approach to the phenomena at hand, namely non-clinical usages of *lame, insane* and *depressed*. Cognitive linguistics emerged in the 1970s as an alternative to the formal approach to language that was dominant at the time. There is not a single theory that connects work within the cognitive linguistic field but rather, they are connected by commitments and principles that then lead to different theories and applications. However, a cognitive approach to language is characterized by a concern with the relationship between human language, the mind and experience (Evans, Bergen & Zinken, 2007, p. 2). Cognitive linguistics is characterized by not considering language an autonomous process but a part of general cognition and thinking. Further, cognitive linguistics claims that the meaning of words and utterances are fundamentally based on human experience and conceptualization.

Lakoff (1990, p. 40) has suggested two general principles guiding all efforts within the cognitive linguistics enterprise: the generalization commitment and the cognitive commitment. The generalization commitment states that cognitive linguistics should aim to characterize general principles that apply to all aspects of language. This commitment stands in contrast to formal linguistics that approaches different parts of the language faculty separately. Formal linguistics commonly claims that different language areas (as phonology or syntax) constitute different structure principles that operate different parts of the language production. Rather than assuming that the language faculty is divided into distinct sections, the generalization commitment is a commitment to investigate “how the various aspects of linguistic knowledge emerge from a common set of human cognitive abilities upon which they draw” (Evans et al., 2007, p. 4). The cognitive commitment is a commitment to work in accordance with what other disciplines have found regarding the brain and the mind. This is the commitment that makes cognitive linguistics both cognitive and interdisciplinary. Given this commitment, the models of language within this area must reflect what is actually known about the human mind (Lakoff, 1990, pp. 40–44).

In addition, this study is placed within the cognitive linguistic field of cognitive semantics. Cognitive semantics approaches the relationship between experience, the conceptual system and the semantic structure in language. Within cognitive semantics there are, according to Evans et al. (2007), four identifiable guiding principles. The principle is conceptual structure is embodied. Within cognitive semantics, the relationship between the mind and our bodies are important. Because of our bodies, we view the world in a way specific to humans. Our bodies function in fundamentally similar ways and we function within the fundamentally same real world. This leads to people sharing possibilities to form abstract conceptualizations and
imagined worlds (Langacker, 1997, p. 233). Lakoff and Johnson (1980) base their Conceptual Metaphor Theory on the principle that conceptual structure is embodied and that our conceptual structure is a consequence of our bodily experiences. Moreover, the second principle that semantic structure is conceptual structure stresses that language does not refer directly to things in a real, external world but rather to concepts in the mind. This means that language is a representation rather than a denotation of the world. In other words, semantic structure is conceptual structure (Evans et al., 2007, p. 7).

The third principle is that meaning representation is encyclopedic and it asserts that a lexical concept does not represent a defined meaning but instead is a way to access knowledge relating to the concept. A lexical unit will be understood by the knowledge related to it and also the context in which it is uttered. This is the process of meaning construction: an appropriate interpretation is chosen based on knowledge and context. There are, of course, conventional meanings connected to some concepts but this principle states that the conventional meaning will work as a way of guiding the meaning construction. The final and fourth principle meaning construction is conceptualization states that language in itself does not encode meaning. Meaning is constructed at a conceptual level, which means that the linguistic units (as words) are prompts for conceptual operations and for recruiting background knowledge. Meaning is, therefore, a process and not something that language carries (Evans et al., 2007, pp. 8–9). In conclusion, cognitive semantics and cognitive linguistics in general are approaches to language that view language as a part of our cognition, that investigate the relationship between experience, meaning, and the conceptual structure and language in the mind.

2.2 Conceptual Blending Theory

2.2.1 Introduction

The study has used Conceptual Blending Theory as its way of explaining the usages of the adjectives analyzed. CBT was introduced by Fauconnier and Turner and is most thoroughly elaborated in their book The way we think (2002). CBT is an attempt to account for what happens in human minds when humans hear and understand linguistic utterances. That is, the theory is concerned with the on-line cognitive processes behind meaning construction. The theory aims to account for a wide range of cognitive processes connected to imagination and creative reasoning. The theory is not merely accounting for linguistic processes but that is, of course, the part of the theory that has been focused on in this study.

Fauconnier and Turner’s Conceptual Blending Theory is concerned with “the mind’s three I’s” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 6), namely identity, integration and imagination. They argue that these operations in human minds are central to constructing meaning in all kinds of linguistic utterances. The operation of identity concerns recognizing identity and sameness, which, according to Fauconnier and Turner, is not a natural beginning place for our minds but rather the result of elaborate cognitive work. Furthermore, the cognitive operation of integration is also a complex process that goes unnoticed in our everyday interaction but that in fact has structural and dynamic properties and operational constraints. Lastly, the operation of
imagination is necessary for the other two operations to function as meaning construction operations. The mind is imaginative and the imagination of the mind is necessary for all instances of meaning construction (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 6).

The processes that Conceptual Blending Theory aims to map are processes that are highly subconscious. Humans seem to just intuitively understand linguistic utterances but Fauconnier and Turner, amongst others, have shown that even the most simple constructions in language are underlain by complex blending (2002, p. 25). For example, when trying to understand the usage of a word, a crucial component is to know what part of our knowledge regarding that word that should be considered and what part should be ignored (Coulson, 2001, p. 16). CBT aims to account for what knowledge is attended to when people process a linguistic utterance. Coulson (2001, pp. 125–126) also argues that it is necessary to appeal to complex cognitive processes even to understand intuitively simple utterances. The same processes are at work, whether people try to understand an utterance involving a metaphor or an utterance containing a simple noun modification.

Central to CBT is that meaning construction involves blending, that is, integration of structure from mental spaces that lead to an emergent structure that is more than its individual parts (Evans et al., 2007). The result of blending is always creative and imaginative, since it is the result of the three central operations that underlie meaning construction. When a person tries to understand an utterance, the utterance usually contains different elements, relations and information. Conceptual blending is a way in which humans compress all the information and conceptual input into graspable entities. When accounting for the blending, CBT usually employs a blending diagram. The blending diagram, also called conceptual integration network, is supposed to highlight elements and relations that are integrated into the blend. Fauconnier and Turner (2002, p. 44) also claim that humans build a kind of integration network in their minds when they construct meaning. Blending diagrams are therefore not merely a tool to explain a cognitive process but an attempt to represent an actual cognitive process. Of course, diagrams are never accurate descriptions of cognitive processes but they are a way of focusing on the informational aspects of the integration (Coulson, 2001, p. 119). In this study, the theory is used to understand extended usages of clinical adjectives and a focus on the information aspect of the blending is what helps an understanding of non-clinical usages, as is the aim of this enquiry.
2.2.2 Blending diagrams

![Blending diagram for "This surgeon is a butcher" (Grady, Oakley & Coulson, 2007).](image)

**Figure 1.** Blending diagram for “This surgeon is a butcher” (Grady, Oakley & Coulson, 2007).

When construction blending diagrams to represent a cognitive process, there are several important constituents to the diagrams. A blending diagram for the utterance “This surgeon is a butcher”, which is discussed by Grady, Oakley and Coulson (2007), will function as an illustrative figure to understand the different parts of the blending diagram, see Figure 1. “This surgeon is a butcher” is a good example of the cognitive process of conceptual blending because there is nothing in solely the linguistic forms of surgeon and butcher that entails that the surgeon is an incompetent surgeon. When the sentence is uttered, the speaker does not (usually) intend to say that the surgeon is severing the flesh of the patient. The meaning of the utterance is much more intricate and a good way of understanding this process is by constructing a blending diagram. The blending diagram shows what concepts that are a part of the process and what concepts that are projected onto the blend.

First of all, blending diagrams typically contains at least three mental spaces, whereof two are input spaces and one is the blended space, which is the carrier of the new emergent meaning structure. Mental spaces, introduced by Fauconnier (1994), are small conceptual sets that are constructed during discourse. Mental spaces are built up of elements and relations between the elements, and they contain the conceptual content that is at work in the process of
conceptual blending. The input spaces are formed around the input of the utterance and contain elements of contextual information and background knowledge. In Figure 1, Input space 1 is formed around the input for surgeon and Input space 2 around the butcher input. Structure from the input spaces is projected to the blended space, and the blended space also develops emergent structure that is not a part of the input spaces. That is, the blended space contains structure from the input spaces but also structure of its own (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, pp. 40–44). For the blend above, the emergent structure is the surgeon’s incompetence.

A basic structuring element of the input spaces is frames. A frame is a packet of knowledge and beliefs that help humans to make sense of experiences. A cognitive frame can be activated by different linguistic forms and the knowledge within that frame can then help in the construction of meaning. Within CBT, frames are invoked in the input spaces and can therefore contribute with further information. For example, the [COMMERCIAL EVENT] frame is a frame that can be evoked by several linguistic forms such as buy, sell and spend. These forms are all connected to the [COMMERCIAL EVENT] frame but the different verbs show different aspects of the commercial event. Buy, for example, focuses on the buyer and the goods but speakers are able to rephrase “x bought milk from y” to “y sold milk to x”. This is possible because humans understand the entire scene of the commercial event when any of the linguistic forms are used, which means that the speaker understand that money is exchanged, even if it is not overtly mentioned because it is background knowledge that is evoked together with the frame (Fillmore, 2007, p. 242). Frames structure input spaces by providing conceptual information that is not stated within the linguistic utterance. To illustrate, if a linguistic utterance contains a linguistic unit such as buy, the input space will include structure that maybe calls for a buyer, a seller and goods. This conceptual information is embedded in buy because it is invoking the [COMMERCIAL EVENT] frame. In similar ways, different lexical units invoke different frames and these bring more information into the blend.

There are constitutive principles of conceptual blending that guide the meaning construction. Firstly, which has already been discussed, the setting up of an integration network with input spaces. Apart from that, the constitutive principles are: matching and counterpart connections, generic space, blending, selective projection and emergent structure. These are essential aspects of blending. Matching and counterpart connections entails a partial matching between the input spaces, that is, that some elements in the input spaces are connected to each other. This matching can be triggered by several kinds of connections such as connections between frames, connections of identity, analogical connections, metaphorical connections or more general connections based on vital relations. Vital relations are, in short, important conceptual relations. Vital relations are ways in which input spaces are connected and related to each other, such as time or cause-effect. There are relations between different input spaces but also relations within the same input space. For example, a vital relation of time connects concepts of time within different input spaces and a cause-effect vital relation can connect cause and effect to a causal chain and form an entity (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, pp. 40–48). In Figure 1, these connections are presented by continuous lines. In the analysis in this study, a
specification of what kind of relation connects them is specified, which is not the case for the blending diagrams in Figure 1 since it functions as an example. However, the connection between the surgeon and the butcher is an example of an identity relation where it is conceived and projected as the same person in the blended space.

Further, an essential aspect of the blending is the generic space, which is sometimes included as a fourth mental space in the blending diagram. The generic space captures the structure that the inputs share. Structure in the generic space is mapped onto the counterparts in the input spaces that share that structure. The generic space is not overtly mapped in the blending diagrams in this study. The generic space does not bring any further clarity in the blending when the utterances analyzed are as general as the ones in this study. However, the understanding of the generic space is still guiding the blend. In Figure 1, however, the generic space is mapped. When there is a clear and restricted meaning of an utterance, the generic space functions well as a way to show what different linguistic and contextual aspects that play a part in the blending. Further, the concept of blending is, of course, an essential aspect of the theory. Blending entails that structure from the input spaces are projected onto a new space, the blended space. The blended space can contain generic information that also is captured in the generic space but the blended space contains specific information that did not exist in the input spaces and that could not exist there as well. The selective projection in conceptual blending entails that not all elements and relations in the input spaces are projected onto the blend. This is also a result of the extensive imagination that is a part of this cognitive process (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, pp. 47–49).

The final part of the blending process is that emergent structure arises in the blend that is more than the information from the input spaces. The emergent structure of the blending diagrams in this study helps an understanding of the extended usages of clinical adjectives where the adjective and the modifyee together gets another meaning than their respective parts. This emergent structure is generated through composition, completion and elaboration (running the blend). Composition is a process where a relation from one space is attributed to elements in the other input space, in Figure 1, this can be seen in how the surgeon gets the role as the butcher. Completion is pattern completion and it occurs when structure in the blend is connected to information stored in long-term memory. Completion makes people bring knowledge into the blend that is not overtly stated in the utterance and people can therefore understand utterances with the help of background knowledge (Coulson & Oakley, 2000, p. 180). Finally, elaboration is the process where the mind simulates or runs the blend imaginatively. A blend can always be elaborated in many different ways and a blend can take many different directions. There is no final solution to a blend and it will be elaborated differently based on what the listener identifies as the purpose and goal of the utterance (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, pp. 44–48).

2.2.3 Applying Conceptual Blending Theory in linguistic research

CBT has an extensive theoretical framework, partly accounted for above. Fauconnier and Turner (2002) have outlined the theory and it has then been developed and adapted within different
branches of research. The present study attempts to apply CBT when analyzing linguistic utterances and in this section, some previous research regarding CBT and language is presented. As the following presentation will show, CBT has been applied on different levels of language, from the interplay between image and words in advertising to modified noun phrases. The research is connected by the use of CBT as a way of understanding meaning construction and why humans interpret different linguistic phenomena the way they do.

Carita Lundmark (2005) applied CBT together with Conceptual Metaphor Theory in her doctoral thesis when analyzing advertising in British magazines. Lundmark combines Conceptual Metaphor Theory and CBT and creates blending diagrams that both contain input spaces and the conventional source-target diagram connected to metaphor theory. Lundmark approaches different kinds of advertisements and investigates in what ways the understanding of them is a result of conventionalized metaphors being elaborated in blending processes. Lundmark’s research points to ways of understanding the interplay between language and human imagination within the advertisement field.

Esther Pascual (2002) used CBT as a way of understanding language at a phrasal level. She argued that imagined conversations underlie the understanding of phrasal constructions as a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy or this “I’m so cool” attitude (Pascual, 2002, pp. 163–172). She argues that the understanding of phrases is based on compression of imagined conversation scenarios where the phrases could have been uttered. The phrase functions as a part-whole compression in the blend where it, as already mentioned, stands for the imagined conversation. Further, Pascual applies CBT and constructs a blending diagram from a linguistic phrasal example from an actual trial. The blend is integrated with a [GENERIC INTERACTION] frame. Her argument is that this integration occurs in most instances of blending on the linguistic level of phrasal constructions.

Several scholars have conducted research on adjectives and CBT, for example, Fauconnier and Turner (2002), Coulson (2001) and Vinogradova (2014). The present study is also concerned with adjectives and is more specifically mapping the interplay between clinical concepts and non-clinical and extended usages of adjectives by applying CBT. Coulson argues that adjectives need to be accounted for with CBT. She proposes that CBT can be used to move beyond a compositional approach when addressing meaning construction. Traditionally, adjectives have been understood with the help of compositionality: the meaning of adjective + modified lies within the unification of features that the two concepts hold. Coulson (2001) exemplifies with brown cow where a compositional approach would entail that people construct meaning by unifying features that define brown with features that define cow. A cognitive linguistic approach to brown cow, on the other hand, states that the statement is not as compositional as it might seem. A cow is not brown through and through and the cow does not even need to be completely brown to be labeled as a brown cow. Further, one can apply the phrase upon things that are neither cows nor brown, like a child’s painting of a cow. A compositional approach cannot account for this without adding new theoretical material while a
cognitive semanticist can appeal to the processes of CBT (Coulson, 2001, pp. 135–137, 159–161).

Further, Coulson (2001) uses the seemingly different noun constructions *small lid* and *hot lid* to demonstrate that CBT is present even in noun constructions that intuitively seem compositional, in this case *small lid*. The lids in question are the lids that are put on cups when you buy beverages in a café or store. A hot lid is the lid suitable to use when the beverage is hot. The adjective does not modify the lid and the meaning construction is guided by conceptual blending. In contrast, *small lid* seems to be a typical case of compositionality where the adjective modifies the size of the lid. Coulson, however, argues that conceptual blending is necessary in understanding this construction as well. She claims that properties as smallness and hotness are related to frames of size and temperature and the meaning construction is a blending process where the contextual information and the scalar properties are part of the process. Smallness is not an objective quality but corresponds with amount of beverage and the size system used at that particular café and so on (Coulson, 2001, pp. 133–140).

In summary, CBT is a theory applied on many different levels of language. CBT has a wide applicability outside the field of linguistics but that is besides the scope of the present study. The analysis of this study places itself within the research presented above by approaching language in similar ways but the phenomena studied differ. By being a widely applicable theory, CBT lends itself well as a tool of approaching most linguistic phenomena and that is also why the present study employs this particular theory for understanding non-clinical usages of clinical adjectives.

### 3 Material and methodology

The study has investigated the adjectives *lame, insane* and *depressed*. The adjectives lent themselves well to analysis because of their quite obvious clinical etymology and their extended meaning in everyday use. The adjective *lame*, in its clinical sense, describes a physical condition contrary to the adjectives *insane* and *depressed* that describe mental conditions.

Corpus data was central to the study. The corpus that was used was the CORE, Corpus of Online Registers of English. The corpus contains over 50 millions words of text from the Internet. The material holds a wide range of web registers, for example personal blogs, travel blogs and interactive discussions. The corpus also contains encyclopedic articles and religious blogs, that is, more formal registers. By using a web-based corpus, it was possible to trace the usage of words in a more informal context, which was a way to trace the less conventional ways that the adjectives might be used in. The different registers that the usages occur in were not mapped in this study because the aim was to account for the different usages within all registers in the corpus.

The use of a corpus when approaching cognitive linguistics is a method that is becoming more frequent. John Newman (2010) claims that the use of corpora is an advantage for cognitive linguistics because it gives usage a prominent position in the understanding of language. Newman argues that, by studying usage, linguists are able to find sub-patterns in the language
that might be left unseen if relying solely on linguistic intuition, which he claims that cognitive linguistics usually is based on. This study used a corpus-based approach to follow Newman’s line of thought and unite a usage-based approach with the study of cognitive concepts in language.

The study was based on both qualitative and quantitative analysis of the data retrieved from the corpus. The advantage with quantitative analysis of data is that it can provide a result that is more generalizable and statistically reliable while a qualitative analysis, on the other hand, can provide a richer and more detailed result focused purely on the material at hand (McEnery & Wilson, 2003, p. 77). Part of the qualitative approach to the corpus in this study was the categorization of the usages of the adjectives. There was no clear and absolute category membership and each use of the adjectives was analyzed with the help of its context and on the basis of that, it was categorized to enable a frequency count and further study. The qualitative analysis was also prominent in the second step of the analysis, which was concerned with constructing blending diagrams from the results of the corpus study. The statistical representation of the data was the way in which a quantitative approach was used.

3.1 Categorization of the data
The corpus contained tokens that were not adjectives but nouns and verbs and these tokens have been disregarded in the compilation of the data. The corpus data was first approached without any fixed categories. Each instance of the corpus was analyzed and when all data was collected, categories were formed that would reflect the findings in the corpus. For the adjectives, the data has been categorized in the superordinate categories clinical and non-clinical use of the adjective. The subordinate categories used in the study differed between the adjectives and was based on the data that had been retrieved. The data was further divided with regards to what the adjectives modified. The categories for the modifeye were also based on the data.

What was modified by the adjectives was categorized in five main classes: human, non-human animate, inanimate objects, verbal nouns and actions. The ‘human’ category contained individuals and groups of humans, what connects them is their humanity. The ‘non-human animate’ category comprised living things, as animals. The ‘inanimate objects’ category comprised objects, both abstract and concrete. The ‘verbal noun’ category contained nouns that are derived from verbs but that did not have a verbal implication but still are connected to a verbal action, as excuse or arrival. The last category ‘actions’ comprised an action, for example reading a book or watching TV.

3.2 Construction of the blending diagrams
The second part of the analysis was focused on constructing blending diagrams that accounted for the usages found in the first part of the analysis. The study has presented extensive data on three adjectives and what they modified. Not all usages have been accounted for in the second part of the study, mainly due to the limited extent of the study but the usages that are accounted for are representations of very common usages, which make them appropriate for case study. The
blending diagrams constitute case studies of some of the non-clinical usages. The blending diagrams aim to give a possible account for general elements and relations that play a part when the adjectives are used in non-clinical ways. The non-clinical usages are the ones focused on since the scope of the study is to investigate the non-clinical usages and their relation to the clinical conditions. The present study has constructed three blending diagrams for three utterances, one for each of the adjectives analyzed.

The blending diagrams are based on very general linguistic utterances. The adjective has been connected with a common modified. The utterances are, for example, “A verbal noun is lame” and “A person is depressed”. Moreover, the utterances that the blending diagrams are aiming to account for are utterances formed as “x is y”. Linguistic utterances in real life are seldom as straightforward as this construction, which means that these artificial utterances bring less contextual information into the picture than more extensive utterances. Sometimes, possible information that might guide the blending is given but on the whole, the lack of contextual information limits the study and the account of the blending.

The general construction of the utterances and the fact that it is central to CBT that the individual human uses their imagination in the elaboration of an utterance calls for an important caveat for the study. The blending diagrams are in no way complete accounts of what plays a role in the integration process behind the understanding of any specific linguistic utterance. The blending diagrams have aimed to account for some general elements and relations that probably play a part when humans utter or understand an utterance similar to the general utterances used in the blending diagrams. Fauconnier and Turner (2002) state that “[r]ather amazingly, no matter how unpredictable creative blending is at every stage, and no matter how various its products seem … it can use the same skeletal mapping schemes again and again and combine them in the same simple ways” (pp. 146–147). The blending diagrams in the present study are an attempt at providing possible skeletal mapping schemes behind our understanding and usage of clinical adjectives in a non-clinical sense.

The blending diagrams are based on elements found within each input space, probable vital relations between the input spaces, a metaphorical counterpart connection (for lame) and frames relating to the input spaces. Further, the construction of the blending diagrams was guided by the governing principles given by Fauconnier and Turner (2002). The elements and relations that are accounted for in the diagrams are based on nuances within the usages that was found in the corpus but also more general analysis of the concepts underlying the usage and what elements they contained. Relations between input spaces are presented by continuous lines between the elements, inner-space relations are presented with brackets within the input space and the projections are presented by dashed lines.

Frames for the input spaces were collected from FrameNet, which is a database with hundreds of frames. When analyzing the possible blends, the FrameNet database was consulted to trace what frames could possibly be invoked by the sentences in question, for example frames for mental conditions. Moreover, the frames found in FrameNet presented both core and peripheral frame elements for the frames. Core frame elements are the elements that are
obligatory to express while the peripheral elements are optional (Fillmore & Baker, 2010, p. 325). The core frame elements were focused upon in this study because of the general utterances that were mapped. In the blending diagrams, frames are represented by a rectangle outside of the input space that they are connected to. In the rectangle, the name of the frame is stated and also the core frame elements.

In addition to the constitutive principles of the blending (see 2.2.2), Fauconnier and Turner (2002) present governing principles as well. These principles constrain the ways that a blend can be constructed and run. These principles are not overtly mapped in blending diagrams but worth noting because they points to the nature of blends and what kind of reasoning that needs to underlie construction of blending diagrams. The overarching goal of conceptual integration is achieving human scale. In other words, for a blend to be successful it should be familiar and understandable for people. All governing and constitutive principles are supposed to lead to a blend that has human scale (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 312). Fauconnier and Turner (2007, p. 393) present seven main governing principles. These principles guide the construction of blending diagrams and they explain why some blends works better than other. The blends that work well are the ones that meet some of the principles quite well.

The guiding principles describe conditions that make the blend optimal. One condition is to have intensified vital relations. Intensifying or transforming vital relations can make diffuse aspects of the blend clear. A way to intensify relation is through compression. Compression can be scaling of relations or that a relation is compressed into another relation, but it can also highlight specific elements in the blend or create new relations that are necessary for achieving human scale. To exemplify the scaling of a relation, a time relation can cover a widespread period of time and the compression of the relation can then scale it down so that the time relation is tighter. This kind of scaling can lead to a lifetime being understood as an entity (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, pp. 312–334).

Further, a blend can achieve human scale if the vital relations are maximized. The blend must also constitute a “tightly integrated scene that can be manipulated as a unit” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2007, p. 303). The elements projected onto the blend should match the counterpart in the input spaces. This means that the blend should keep the same topology in the input spaces and the blended space. When viewing the blend as a unit, the connections between the input spaces need to be maintained. The blend must be possible to “unpack”, that is, the listener must be able to reconstruct the entire process. Also, if an element appears in the blend, it should be significant in some way. These are the governing principles presented by Fauconnier and Turner (2007, p. 303) but a blend does not need to meet all these principles well, especially since the principles are competing.

One kind of compression that is apparent in all the blends in this study is the compression of vital relations into the property relation. When Fauconnier and Turner (2002, p. 318) describe this they exemplify with a loud man. In the blend underlying the perceiving of a man as loud is a cause-effect relation, the man is perceived as loud because his actions make a lot of noise. This relation is compressed into an essential property of being loud. The cause-effect relation is
compressed into something more conceptually salient, a property of the person. This is the case for all the adjectives in the blends in this study. A compression of some kind of relation (like cause-effect) occurs and the result is a property relation, which is a less diffuse relation. This occurs in all the blends in this study because the “x is y” form of the utterances, which states a property relation between x and y.

4 Lame

Lame was chosen for this study because of its clinical connotation and also because it can be used to describe a physical clinical condition, which separates it from depressed and insane that both can be used to describe a mental clinical condition. The use of lame as a clinical adjective is quite archaic, something that the study concludes, but that increases the relevancy of studying the non-clinical usages of the adjective.

The adjective lame occurs in the CORE 395 times, which makes it the least frequent of the adjectives studied. The non-clinical usage of lame was divided into two categories, both of which are indicating a lack of some features. The categories were ‘lacking social prestige’ and ‘lacking power’. The ‘lacking social prestige’ category indicates that the word modified by the adjective lacks features that mostly are connected to quite subjective things like being cool or interesting. The modifyee lacks a feature that the speaker experiences in the relationship to the modifyee. The ‘lacking power’ category indicates a lack of power, usually connected to weakness or invalidity and was often used in a figurative context.

4.1 Usages of lame

The data in Table 1 suggests that lame is generally used in a non-clinical sense, 93.4% of the time. The subordinate categories of the non-clinical use are quite equally divided, ‘lacking social prestige’ lame occurs 197 times in the corpus and ‘lacking power’ lame occurs 172 times. Further, the clinical use of lame constitutes merely 6.6% of the data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Usage</th>
<th>Tokens</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clinical</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-clinical</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>93.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacking social prestige</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>49.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacking power</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1.1 The modifyee of clinical lame

The modifyee of clinical lame is either human or non-human animate in the material. As can be seen in Table 2, the modifyee is quite equally divided between the two categories. When a human is modified by clinical lame the text is either biblical or old. Except for the instances
where clinical *lame* is used to describe how Jesus heals lame people, the only instances of clinical lame are found in texts from the 19th century or earlier. The non-human animate that is modified by clinical *lame* is a horse in all instances in the corpus.

### Table 2. The modifyee of clinical *lame*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modifyee</th>
<th>Tokens</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-human animate</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data suggests that the clinical use of *lame* is archaic when used to modify humans. The clinical sense of *lame* when speaking of humans seems, accordingly, not to be appropriate any more. Lameness of horses, on the other hand, is a medical condition that is used today. This use is, however, restricted to a very specific context of people knowing of and discussing horses. All uses in the corpus came from interactive discussions on forums dedicated to horses.

#### 4.1.2 The modifyee of ‘lacking power’ *lame*

The data presented in Table 3 suggests that ‘lacking power’ *lame* typically modifies a verbal noun. Verbal nouns constitute almost half of the data. Verbal nouns are commonly connected to some kind of action performed by the body, either physically or mentally. The lacking of power in these situations is arguably connected to being weak or to insufficient performance. The lack of power should, in this category, accordingly be understood as lack of power to perform well or do enough. Further, the use of ‘lacking power’ *lame* to modify actions can be understood in roughly the same way. The difference is mainly whether the action is expressed directly or through a nominalization.

### Table 3. The modifyee of ‘lacking power’ *lame*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modifyee</th>
<th>Tokens</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inanimate objects</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal nouns</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lame duck</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The verbal nouns that most commonly collocate directly with *lame* in the *CORE* are *excuse/s* (16 times), *attempt* (12 times), and *responses* (4 times). The use of *lame* in correlation with these verbal nouns suggests a figurative lack of power. The lame attempt is not enough to succeed, the lame excuse is not enough to pardon the person’s behavior and the lame response is too weak considering what it is a response to. These examples from the corpus illustrate the use of *lame* modifying verbal nouns:
(1) In my comment there, it was a lame attempt at a joke and yours was a lame attempt at a joke, too, I guess, because nobody got it.

(2) … thinks I am dumping him but just using a lame excuse therefore he is staying away too out of pride?

(3) What matters here is the stuff outside the confessional box: the lame responses to abuse that seem calculated to protect paedophile priests rather than their victims.

The examples (1) to (3) all entail a weakness of the verbal noun that is modified. The use of the adjective also expresses a failure in performing an action, in the examples above the actions are connected to speech acts.

Inanimate objects are modified by ‘lacking power’ lame 22 times in the corpus and they constitute the second largest category in the material. The inanimate objects that ‘lacking power’ lame modifies are objects that are supposed to function in a particular way, such as computer processors or a formula. The use of ‘lacking power’ lame when used with an inanimate object typically refers to a failure to perform certain actions. This is in accordance with the use of ‘lacking power’ lame for verbal nouns. The use is often connected to a failure or weakness, either a weak verbal noun or a failure in performing the purpose that the object has.

The tokens of lame duck are presented as its own category in Table 3, since it constituted more than 25% of the material. Lame duck is a fixed expression and it either modifies a president or a political session before the president has begun their turn, but after the election. Since it is a fixed expression, it is not considered in depth in the study. However, the existence of this expression strengthens the claim that ‘lacking power’ lame entails weakness and failure to perform.

‘Lacking power’ lame is arguably based in an understanding of the bodily experience of lameness: being unable to use a body part entails a loss of power. Despite the fact that most people never have experienced clinical lameness, humans’ bodies help the understanding of ‘lacking power’ lame. As Lakoff (1987, p. 267) argues, our bodily experience has a structure and we conceptualize more abstract structures according to these structures. A basic-level structure is, for example, our capability to move, which is the basic-level structure that is the basis for a metaphorical understanding of lame. Lameness is juxtaposed with the basic-level structure of being capable of bodily movement, which leads to the rise of a metaphorical structure (see 4.3 for further discussion on the role of metaphor in the use of lame).

4.1.3 The modifyee of ‘lacking social prestige’ lame

The ‘lacking social prestige’ lame modifies inanimate objects about half of the time in the data. The modifyee is a human about 21% of the time and the modifyee is an action about 20% of the time. When the modifyee is an action, it is worth noting that the action is often connected to a human. The action described as lame is, for example, telling your family that you love them.
extension, stating that these actions are lame is stating that the person performing the action is lame.

Table 4. The modifyee of ‘lacking social prestige’ lame

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modifyee</th>
<th>Tokens</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inanimate objects</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>50.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal nouns</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The category that is most frequent in the data in Table 4 is the inanimate objects category, constituting 50.3% of the data. Accordingly, non-clinical ‘lacking social prestige’ lame is typically modifying either an object or a person.

The objects modified by ‘lacking social prestige’ lame are mainly objects that carry social status and are valued in a social context. The modifyee can be music, a joke or a movie. The objects are connected to culture, which is a big carrier of social prestige in society. The sentences below illustrate the use of ‘lacking social prestige’ lame as modifying objects.

(4) For bands like Pearl Jam, their immediate predecessor that they wanted to destroy was lame metal and what they saw as the corporatisation of metal…

(5) Our games were particularly lame, as he was exceptionally flooded in game one…

An expression that appeared in the material was lame stream media, used by people criticizing the mainstream media and the Establishment. This is a fairly unconventional expression, not at all a fixed phrase in the same way as lame duck. The forming of new expressions with ‘lacking social prestige’ lame actualizes its usage today. It is arguably a productive adjective.

Moreover, the lack of social prestige can be considered an extension of the ‘lack of power’ lame. The lack of power in this use of lame is more specified to social situations. What is expressed is a failure to perform according to the social standards. These standards can be connected to coolness but also things like being interesting or smart.

4.2 Lame in the OED

The adjective lame has, according to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), been a part of the English language since around 725. The clinical use of the adjective came first and the OED dates the use of lame meaning “disabled or impaired in any way” from c725. The first non-clinical use is dated to c1374 and the use is the ‘lacking power’ sense, defined as “maimed, halting; imperfect or defective, unsatisfactory as wanting a part or parts”. The ‘lacking social prestige’ sense of lame, in the OED defined as “of a person: inept, naive, easily fooled; spec. unskilled in the fashionable behaviour of a particular group, socially inept” is dated to 1942. The
OED presents a chronology of the adjective that is in accordance with the data presented in this study. The sense of the adjective that has been around the longest is the least common and the newest sense is the most common in the data presented in this study. The OED does not present any meaning of lame that is not accounted for in the material. The clinical use, the ‘lacking power’ sense and lame duck are the three main entries in the dictionary and the ‘lacking social prestige’ lame is a draft addition to the dictionary. To conclude, the OED presents definitions of lame that corresponds with data presented in the present study.

4.3 Blending lame

The clinical usage of lame constitutes merely 6.6% of the data. The different non-clinical senses of lame, namely ‘lacking power’ and ‘lacking social prestige’, are quite far from the clinical condition of lameness. Clinical lameness is a physical condition where the function in body parts is hindered. The non-clinical usages of lame are not connected to physical conditions but describe a lack of some features. The connection between the clinical condition of lameness and the non-clinical usage of lame can be accounted for with a combination of Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Fauconnier and Turner’s (2002) Conceptual Blending Theory. Grady, Oakly and Coulson (2007) have argued that these theories should not be considered competing but rather complementary theories because Conceptual Metaphor Theory can account for complex processes of blending. The metaphor LAMENESS IS LACK OF POWER is arguably underlying the non-clinical usages of lame.

In the construction of the blends, a metaphorical counterpart connection is central for the non-clinical usages of lame. Fauconnier and Turner (2002) do not specify the concept of metaphorical counterpart connections more than acknowledging them as a special kind of conceptualization. Grady (2005) has established a framework for the class of metaphorical counterpart connections within CBT. I argue that the primary metaphor LAMENESS IS LACK OF POWER constitutes a metaphoric counterpart connection necessary for the blends to run in non-clinical senses. Grady presents experiential correlation as a basis for metaphorical blends, which follows Lakoff and Johnson’s argument. He argues that metaphorical blends based on experiential correlation is a way to explain metaphorical blends that do not seem to be possible to account for merely with the process of online projection. He argues that if there is a stored association between two concepts that are based on experiential correlation, it is likely that when a cognitive representation of the one is activated, the representation of the other will be activated as well (Grady, 2005, p. 1605). This is, arguably, the case for blends involving the adjective lame that are run in non-clinical ways.

The experiential correlation between lameness and lack of power is highly connected to the bodily experience of humans. Naturally, most people have not experienced the clinical and protracted state of lameness but the connection between a lame body part and the lack of power that it results in is understandable for all humans with a fairly normatively functioning body. Humans have, for short periods of time, as when breaking a leg or just losing the feeling in a body part for a while, experienced the lack of power in being lame, without having been
clinically lame. Furthermore, Grady (2005, pp. 1605–1608) presents three conditions that must be fulfilled for experiential correlation to lead to entrenched metaphorical connections. These conditions are fulfilled by the LAMENESS IS LACK OF POWER metaphor. The first condition is that the source concept refers to a basic sensory experience; in this metaphor it is the concept of lameness. The target concept refers to a fundamental element of mental experience; in this case the experience of lack of power. The second condition is that the concepts must have the same schematic structure. For this metaphor, both lack of power and lameness are construable as states. The third condition is that they must vary directly with each other, if a difference occurs in one domain, such a difference must correspond with a difference in the other domain. For this metaphor this means that a higher degree of lameness corresponds with more extensive lack of power. In line with Grady, I argue that this metaphor is entrenched based on the experiential correlation, the experiential connection is not present in all instances where lame is a part of an utterance, which strengthens the claim that the process is entrenched.

4.4 Blending “A verbal noun is lame”

\[\text{“A verbal noun is lame”}
\]

\[\text{Figure 2. Blending diagram for “A verbal noun is lame”}
\]

The study presents a case study of a blending diagram for the utterance “A verbal noun is lame”. When a verbal noun is modified by lame, the data suggests that the sense in which lame is used is most often ‘lacking power’ (see Table 4). Therefore, the blend constructed for the utterance “A verbal noun is lame”, shown in Figure 2, focuses on the possible components of the blend when the result is that the utterance is understood as that the verbal noun lacks power in some way. The blending diagram has two input spaces, one formed around lame and one around the verbal
noun. Henceforth, the input space for *lame* is referred to as Input space 1 and the input space for the verbal noun as Input space 2.

As argued in 4.3, blending *lame* entails a metaphorical connection that is based on the metaphor LAMENESS IS LACK OF POWER. Hence, an important connection that is evoked in the blend is the metaphorical connection between the input spaces. The linguistic form *lame* recruits the concept of lack of power that is connected to the unexpressed Person in Input space 2. As already stated, the metaphorical connection between *lame* and lack of power is highly unlikely to occur in every instance of the non-clinical use of *lame*. It is likely that the structure is recruited because of an entrenched metaphor, namely LAMENESS IS LACK OF POWER. The metaphorical connection leads the connection between *lame* and the person entailing lack of power, not lameness. Further, Input space 1 also contains a person that is connected by an identity relation to the person in Input space 2. The person is invoked in the input space because *lame* as a concept entails a person that possesses the lameness, whether it is clinical lameness or non-clinical figurative lameness. Therefore, there is also a property relation between *lame* and the person in Input space 1.

Input space 2 contains, as already mentioned, an unexpressed person performing the verbal noun. Verbal nouns have undergone a nominalization process from verbs to nouns, in which they usually lose the need to specify an agent. However, our understanding of verbal nouns is commonly connected to our understanding of the verbal action underlying the verbal noun. In the data the most common verbal nouns were *excuse, attempt* and *response*. These verbal nouns are usually used with a possessive pronoun, therefore stating the agent of the action in the verbal noun. Also, a verbal noun is often an intentional act. FrameNet provides an [INTENTIONALLY ACT] frame with the core frame elements Agent and Act. Arguably, these elements are required in Input space 2 when the verbal noun is an intentional act. The Agent is the person performing the verbal noun and the act is the verbal action that has been nominalized into a verbal noun. A cause-effect relation connects the Agent in Input space 2 to the Act. Fauconnier and Turner (2002, p. 96) state that Producer-Produced is one of several (unmentioned) subcategories of the vital relation Cause-Effect. It is a subcategory within the vital relation because a producer is a cause and the produced is the effect of the producer and their action. The relation between the Agent and the Act is of the Producer-Produced kind. Furthermore, the most common verbal nouns in the corpus are all based on actions with a quite clear goal. For instance, an excuse is meant to lead to forgiveness and an attempt has a goal to succeed. Accordingly, Input space 2 may also contain the goal behind the verbal noun. The goal has no connection to the other input space but is still projected onto the blend. This is a case of the selective projection that Fauconnier and Turner (2002, p. 47) put as a constitutive principle of blending.

The vital relations in the blend are a metaphorical counterpart connection within Input space 1, a cause-effect relation between the Agent and the Act, an identity relation between the person in Input space 1 and the person in Input space 2, and a property relation between *lame* and the person. Compression of the relations occurs in different ways. Fauconnier and Turner do
not specify how the governing principles relate to metaphorical counterpart connections so there is no framework to guide an argument relating to that compression. However, the identity relation between the person in Input space 1 and the person in Input space 2 is compressed by scaling into one perceived and specific person, that also is the Agent of the verbal action. The property relation is also scaled down so that the lack of power is perceived as a property of the person. Further, the cause-effect relation between the Act and the Agent is compressed to being the perceived entity of the Act. In the blend, the Agent is not overtly present and the features of the person have been fused as being essential properties of the verbal noun.

The elements in the input spaces do not necessarily entail an insufficient performance. The failure present in the blended space is a result of an elaboration of the blend. The failure to perform and reaching a set goal is, hence, a part of the emergent structure. The failure to perform was also a nuance found in the corpus. By employing CBT in accounting for the meaning construction, it is possible to account for nuances beyond what can be retrieved from each input space. This arguably shows the necessity of blending for understanding the usage of *lame* in this kind of utterances.

5  **Insane**

*Insane* was chosen for the study because it, like the other adjectives, can refer to a clinical condition. It pairs together with *lame* in that both adjectives are quite archaic in their clinical use. *Insane* is, however, connected to *depressed* in that both adjectives describe clinical mental conditions. There are 808 instances of *insane* in the corpus, which makes it the most frequently occurring adjective of those analyzed. The non-clinical use of *insane* was divided into three subordinate categories, namely ‘mentally deranged’, ‘extreme’ and ‘stupid’. ‘Mentally deranged’ *insane* is often used derogatory, in contrast to clinical *insane* were it is used to describe a factual (and clinical) mental state. The ‘stupid’ and ‘extreme’ categories both have a sense of unbelievability in them and what separates them is that ‘stupid’ *insane* is used in a negative sense and ‘extreme’ *insane* is used in a positive or neutral sense. This was a slight difference in meaning that was relevant in understanding the impact that the concept insanity has on the usage.

5.1  **Usages of insane**

The usage of *insane* is non-clinical in 88.2% of the data. The use of clinical *insane* is hence quite uncommon in the data, which can be seen in the figures in Table 5. The three subordinate non-clinical categories are quite equally extended in the data. The most common category is ‘mentally deranged’, followed by ‘stupid’ and lastly ‘extreme’.
Table 5. Usages of *insane*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Usage</th>
<th>Tokens</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clinical</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-clinical</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>88.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentally deranged</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stupid</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.1 The modifyee of clinical *insane*

The figures in Table 6 show that clinical *insane* generally modifies humans. In the material, almost 93% of the clinical usage has a human modified. The instances of non-human animate as modified are all connected to the same forum post that poses the question if animals can go insane. This is not usually a term used about animals but it was used within that discussion and the clinical properties of human insanity was mapped onto animals and their behavior.

Table 6. The modifyee of clinical *insane*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modifyee</th>
<th>Tokens</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>92.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-human animate</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inanimate objects</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.05%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The instance where the modifyee is an inanimate object is in a context where a woman discusses a person’s work of art and the artist’s insanity and states that she did not find his art insane. The only instance where an action is the modifyee is in a counterfactual statement, where it cannot be considered insane not wanting to fly. Hence, clinical *insane* is closely connected to a human modified in the corpus.

5.1.2 The modifyee of ‘mentally deranged’ *insane*

The modifyee of ‘mentally deranged’ *insane* is most commonly human. The figures in Table 7 show that the modifyee is a human almost 90% of the time. This is fairly expected, considering that the adjective entails mental instability and humans are usually possible sufferers of mental instability because of the constitution the human mind.
‘Mentally deranged’ *insane* refers to the concept of clinical *insane*. When something is modified as ‘mentally deranged’ *insane*, it means that the modifyee has shown behavior (etc.) that a clinically insane person might do, the difference is that this person might just be ‘mentally deranged’ *insane* for the moment, or in performing that particular action. It is a lesser form of the clinical condition. The ‘mentally deranged’ *insane* describes a mental condition not connected to the intellect of the modifyee but rather the intent and the rationality of the intent.

(6) An important point to note is that ‘normal’ women who are not into politics, academia, feminism and so on are mostly not hostile to men like the insane PC types are…

In example (6), *insane* is used as a derogative adjective that aims to disarm the ideas of the modifyee. The utterance is not concerned with the modifyee’s factual mental state but rather makes a statement regarding the modifyee’s behavior and position. This strengthens the argument that ‘mentally deranged’ *insane* should be considered a non-clinical use of *insane* since it does not modify a factual mental state as clinical *insane* arguably does. ‘Mentally deranged’ *insane* is used to express subjective opinions regarding humans’ intellectual capabilities and decisions.

### 5.1.3 The modifyee of ‘stupid’ *insane*

The ‘stupid’ *insane* category carries usages with a negative value, without necessarily referring to a person’s state of mind, as is the case for ‘mentally deranged’ *insane*. This category contains usages of the adjective that could be rephrased as stupid or unbelievable, in a negative sense.

#### Table 7. The modifyee of ‘mentally deranged’ *insane*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modifyee</th>
<th>Tokens</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>89.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-human animate</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inanimate objects</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal nouns</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 8. The modifyee of ‘stupid’ *insane*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modifyee</th>
<th>Tokens</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inanimate objects</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal nouns</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The most commonly modified categories of ‘stupid’ *insane* are inanimate objects and actions. As the figures in Table 8 show, they comprise 43.3% and 42% of the data, respectively. The inanimate objects that are modified are often connected to policies, systems, laws and other things constructed by humans. The stupidity in this context is the idea underlying the system and the fact that they do not function in the way the person uttering the statement think that they should. When the modifyee is an action, the mental state of the person performing the action is implied. The examples from the corpus illustrate usages of ‘stupid’ *insane* and in (7) the modifyee is an inanimate object and (8) has an action as the modifyee.

(7) *how about this insane financial system where all aspects of our society have become enslaved to!!!*

(8) It’s insane to lock up hundreds of thousands of people, over 95% of whom will be released back into society some day.

Despite that the modifyee in (7) and (8) are objects and actions, the use of ‘stupid’ *insane* calls from stupidity or irrationality, which are concepts most commonly connected to humans. As earlier stated, ‘stupid’ *insane*, when modifying actions or inanimate objects, often refers to the ideas or opinions that underlie the inanimate object or the actions. Accordingly, when considering the modifyee of ‘stupid’ *insane* it is of importance to see beyond the inanimate object or action and also consider the intent and ideas underlying them.

The use of ‘stupid’ *insane* seems to call from the stigma connected to insanity and mental diseases. From the stigma comes the negative connotation that is needed to be able to talk about something unbelievable in a negative way by using this adjective. Mental diseases are often connected to mental instability and also stupidity. These presuppositions and prejudices might also be a reason for the usage of *insane* in the negative sense.

### 5.1.4 The modifyee of ‘extreme’ *insane*

The category of *insane* that is named ‘extreme’ is a category containing the usages of *insane* in a non-clinical and positive or neutral way. More specifically, ‘extreme’ *insane* modifies something that is extreme or unbelievable, in a good way. This category has to be considered in relation to ‘stupid’ *insane* (see 5.1.3) where the sense of the word has a negative value but still can be used to express extremity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modifyee</th>
<th>Tokens</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inanimate objects</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>69.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal nouns</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As shown in Table 9, the modifyee of ‘extreme’ insane is an inanimate object in almost 70% of the data. Amount/s occur in direct collocation with insane 24 times in the corpus. The use of insane together with amount/s is a neutral use of the word where the extremity is focused upon. The modifyee of ‘extreme’ insane is not non-human animate in any instance in the corpus. The use of ‘extreme’ insane with a human modified is also a very restricted; it comprises merely 3.2% of the hits in the corpus.

‘Extreme’ insane can be used about the inanimate object without referring to underlying ideas or intents, as is the case for ‘stupid’ insane. As a result, the inanimate objects that are modified by these senses of insane are often quite different. This study has not mapped and categorized within the categories of the modifyee but these general nuances appear when considering collocations and also sentences such as (7) and (8) above.

The use of ‘extreme’ insane is arguably connected to the part of the concept ‘insanity’ that reflects being out of the ordinary. A person that was clinically insane was a person behaving in an extreme, excessive way. However, the use of ‘extreme’ insane does not seem to rely on the stigma connected to clinical insanity, which arguably is the case for ‘stupid’ insane. The two different senses draw from different aspect of the concept of insanity but the clinical condition of insanity seems to be a basis for all usages of insane.

5.2 Insane in the OED
The first recorded instance of insane, according to the OED, dates to around 1575. The OED presents two active uses of insane where one is connected to a person’s mental state and the other is used to describe actions that are mad and irrational. The OED definition of insane as modifying a person’s mental state has two subordinate categories where one is a more general statement, in my terminology, a non-clinical use, and one refers to a clinical condition. The categorization in the OED does not completely correspond with the categorization in this study.

The OED definition of the action modified by insane is “Mad, idiotic, utterly senseless, irrational” and this corresponds with the ‘stupid’ category in this study. Based on the material at hand, the value difference between the ‘stupid’ category and the ‘extreme’ category was found relevant to distinguish. The first instance of insane was in the non-clinical ‘mentally deranged’ sense, at around 1575, as earlier stated. The clinical use of insane has its first recorded instance in 1786 and the OED definition of insane as modifying actions appeared in 1842.

This study found that ‘stupid’ insane was not mostly used to modify actions, which the OED suggests. The most common modified of ‘stupid’ insane was an inanimate object. Further, the study found that a more extensive categorization was needed to account for the values connected to the different non-clinical usages of insane, hence, ‘stupid’ and ‘extreme’ insane are here treated as two distinct usages while in the OED they are not.
5.3 Blending “An inanimate object is insane”

Figure 3. Blending diagram for “An inanimate object is insane”.

An inanimate object is the most common modified for both ‘stupid’ insane and ‘extreme’ insane. It is very predominant for ‘extreme’ insane, constituting almost 70% of the usage. However, the usage within that category is far more diverse than within the ‘stupid’ insane usage and therefore, the blending diagram will focus on possible element for when “an inanimate object is insane” run as “an inanimate object is ‘stupid’ insane”. As accounted for in 5.1.3., the inanimate object modified by ‘stupid’ insane is often something that can be connected to human beings’ ideas or opinions. Hence, when an inanimate object is referred to as insane in this sense, the reference can often be extended to underlying human thoughts or ideas. Arguably, when constructing a blending diagram for this utterance, there is one input space for insane and one for the inanimate object, henceforth Input space 1 and Input space 2, as can be seen in Figure 3.

Input space 1 is the input space for the adjective insane. Arguably, the frame [MENTAL PROPERTY] is recruited. However, insane is not listed as a lexical unit connected to the frame in FrameNet. Since very similar lexical units as crazy and idiotic are connected to the frame, it is possible that insane should be added to lexical units connected to the frame. The [MENTAL PROPERTY] frame is defined as:

The adjectives and nouns in this frame are all based on the idea that mental properties may be attributed to a person (Protagonist) by a (usually implicit) Judge on the basis of that person’s Behavior, as broadly understood. Though on a conceptual level these words always attribute mental properties to people, they may be applied to Protagonist’s Behaviors as well, with the understanding that the Behavior is revealing a (usually temporary) property of the Protagonist responsible for it. (FrameNet)
The frame has two core frame elements, Protagonist and Behavior. If the [MENTAL PROPERTY] frame is recruited for the utterance, the utterance will call for a relationship between the Protagonist of the frame and a person in Input space 1. Input space 1 contains a person because of the frame but also because the concept of insanity calls for a person holding the property of insanity. Input space 1 does arguably also evoke background knowledge connected to being insane. When the blend is run as 'stupid' insane, the background knowledge recollected is connected to the stigma of mental disabilities and prejudice about mental conditions as affecting a person’s intellect. A property relation connects this background knowledge to the unexpressed person in Input space 2. Insane does not seem to be based on such an elaborate metaphorical entrenchment as lame. The background knowledge for insane is accessible without metaphorical entrenchment, which is shown by the fact that there is a non-clinical usage of insane that is referring to mental instability. Hence, the linguistic form is a point of access to knowledge regarding insanity. Regarding lexical units as points of access is following the cognitive linguistic principle that meaning representation is encyclopedic (Evans et al., 2007, p. 8).

In Input space 2, there is an unexpressed person or people behind the inanimate object, such as legislators or creators. An identity relation connects the person to the person in Input space 1. Input space 2 also contains the factual inanimate object. This would be connected to the Behavior called for by the [MENTAL PROPERTY] frame. Further, within Input space 2 there is a cause-effect relation between the unexpressed person and the object. This cause-effect relation is of the Producer-Produced kind (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 96) since the unexpressed person is the instigator of the object in one way or the other.

The vital relations that become apparent in the blending diagram are an identity relation between the person in Input space 1 and the person in Input space 2, a cause-effect relation between the unexpressed person and the inanimate object, and a property relation between the background knowledge connected to mental disabilities and person in Input space 1 and between insane and the person in Input space 1. These relations are in different ways compressed and projected onto the blend. The property relation between the background information regarding mental disability (for example prejudice regarding mental disability as entailing stupidity) and the person is compressed to a clear, identifiable property of the person. This in turn affects the compression of the cause-effect relation between the person in Input space 2 and the inanimate object. The unexpressed person is then already carrying the negative properties of mental disability so, when it is compressed, the new perceived entity, the inanimate object, will carry the properties of mental disabilities that the background knowledge has brought into the blend.

The blended space will then contain a structure where, in this case, stupidity is a property of the inanimate object, which means that there is a property relation between the object and stupidity within the blend. Stupidity is retrieved because of background knowledge and prejudice so in this blending diagram, stupidity stands for whatever bias that might be guiding the blend. The corpus data showed that prejudice that insanity entails stupidity often guided the understanding of insane. When an utterance of this kind is analyzed in a real speech act, the
context can determine different ways in which the blend is run. Contextual information might give a reason for why the judgment is made and also specify the application since the inanimate object is overtly stated and then, background knowledge connected to that concept will be retrieved and used in the blending process.

6 Depressed

The adjective depressed was chosen because of its connection to a clinical condition. Depressed differs from the other adjectives in this study in that the clinical condition of depression is a current clinical condition. The use of depressed as describing a clinical condition is not archaic like insane and lame, rather depressed is used more as a clinical adjective now than before. Depression is a current issue, maybe even an increasing problem, in Western societies, at least in the sense that depression as a condition is discussed more (Horowitz & Wakefield, 2007, pp. 5–8).

Non-clinical and clinical depressed occur 774 times in the corpus. The non-clinical use of depressed was divided into two categories. The first category was ‘miserable’ and the other category referred to economical depression. Both non-clinical categories are quite clear in their relation to the concept ‘depression’. ‘Economically challenged’ depressed refers to economic depression, a downturn in economic activity. ‘Miserable’ depressed, on the other hand, is connected to the clinical state of depression. Also, depressed used as meaning ‘pressed down’ and ‘lowered’ have been disregarded in this study because they stem from the verb press rather than the concept of depression.

Depressed was also found to sometimes modify a human’s state of mind, which is presented in Tables 11–12 below as a subordinate category to the human modified. It is not technically a human that is modified but that state of mind implies that it is the human that is depressed. The close connection between the adjective and a human modified suggests that the adjective has a quite strong connection to the clinical condition. Unlike the other adjectives in this study, the meaning of depressed is very closely connected to a human modified and the mental condition of humans, whether the condition is to be considered clinical or not.

6.1 Usages of depressed

The usages of depressed were almost equally divided between the clinical and non-clinical usage. The clinical use represents 48.6% of the data and the non-clinical use represents 51.4%. The fact that clinical depressed constitutes almost half of the material suggests that the clinical condition of depression is relevant today. As Table 10 shows, the non-clinical use of depressed is most commonly the ‘being miserable’ sense.
Table 10. Usages of *depressed*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Usage</th>
<th>Tokens</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clinical</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-clinical</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miserable</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically challenged</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.1.1 The modifyee of clinical *depressed*

The modifyee of clinical *depressed* is almost exclusively human. There are three instances in the data where the modifyee is either non-human animate or an inanimate object. The human modified, as shown in Table 11, constitute 99.2% of the data.

Table 11. The modifyee of clinical *depressed*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modifyee</th>
<th>Tokens</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>99.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of mind</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-human animate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inanimate objects</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.1.2 The modifyee of ‘miserable’ *depressed*

The modifyee of ‘miserable’ *depressed* is also almost exclusively human. As the figures in Table 12 show, a human is the modifyee 97.4% of the time, followed by inanimate objects that are modified 2.3% of the time and there is also one instance of a non-human animate as the modifyee.

Table 12. The modifyee of ‘miserable’ *depressed*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modifyee</th>
<th>Tokens</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>97.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of mind</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-human animate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inanimate objects</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When *depressed* is used as ‘miserable’, the language user seems to be aware of its clinical background. There is a hint of self-diagnosis within the use as well; that what the person is experiencing is a form of clinical depression, but to a lesser degree. Example (9) below shows a fairly common approach to the non-clinical use of depressed. It is a state of mind that most
people experience, at one time or the other. However, ‘miserable’ _depressed_ does usually not describe a lasting condition but something temporary.

(9) Because most people have been a bit low, a bit sad, a bit depressed at one time in their life, and so can’t see what all the fuss is about.

‘Miserable’ _depressed_ is often used when the person thinks of events that the language user finds miserable, as a presidential race or other political event, as shown in example (10). Moreover, it is used when the language user is feeling sadness to different degrees.

(10) … I’ve spent the last 48 hours forgetting to be depressed about the presidential race.

In conclusion, the use of ‘miserable’ _depressed_ is closely connected to a human modified and it is also connected to the clinical condition of depression. When speakers describe their mood as depressed, they seem to bear the concept of clinical depression in mind and place their feelings within a spectrum of feelings that touch upon clinical depression as a concept.

6.1.3 The modifyee of ‘economically challenged’ _depressed_

When ‘economically challenged’ _depressed_ is used in the data, the modifyee is always an inanimate object, as Table 13 shows. The inanimate object is usually a region or a market. The extension of the use of ‘economically challenged’ _depressed_ is quite narrow. Further, in relation to all instance of _depressed_ in the corpus, the use of ‘economically challenged’ _depressed_ is quite peripheral. It constitutes about 6% of the data (see Table 10).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modifyee</th>
<th>Tokens</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inanimate objects</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A depressed area or region is defined as “a region where unemployment and a low standard of living prevail” (dictionary.com). A depressed market is a market with long-standing downturn in economic activity. The use of ‘economically challenged’ _depressed_ can be considered a fixed phrase, extending to regions and markets in economical problems. The etymological background of the word is besides this study but it is possible that the use of ‘economically challenged’ _depressed_ in some way draws from the concept of depression. This connection could arguably be based on similarities between being low in spirit and a low economic standard.

6.2 Depressed in the OED

The _OED_ does not distinguish between a clinical and non-clinical use of _depressed_ when referring to a mental state. The first recorded use of the adjective _depressed_, in referring to a mental state, dates to 1621. Because of the _OED_’s definition of the word, it is not possible to
trace the first instance of the clinical and non-clinical use respectively. The first recorded instance of ‘economically challenged’ *depressed* dates to 1928. Apart from the use of *depressed* as a clinical adjective and a non-clinical adjective used to describe low-spiritedness or economical depression, the *OED* presents several definitions of *depressed* that are connected to being lowered or pressed down. These definitions are in accordance with the disregarded findings in the corpus.

The *OED* does not consider the difference in meaning between *depressed* as a clinical condition and as an occasional mental state. As stated earlier, depression is more often spoken about as a clinical condition now than before. Arguably, the *OED* has not had the time to change their definition with the increased use of *depressed* in a clinical way. However, even though clinical depression might be a more recent concept than the usage of *depressed* as describing low-spiritedness, the non-clinical usage of *depressed* seemed to be connected to the clinical condition of depression. This could arguably be a result of what Horowitz and Wakefield (2007, p. 4) state, namely that depression is a condition very prevalent in the modern societies and the focus on depression is a way of accounting for how the relatively new concept of clinical depression is guiding the language use of *depressed*.

The present study found that a distinction between the clinical and non-clinical sense was necessary since they entail completely different states of mind. Naturally, they both describe mental states of sadness but depending on whether a person uses the adjective non-clinically or clinically, different contextual information is inferred. For example, if a person is described as non-clinically depressed, the state of mind is understood as temporary and possibly explained by specific events in the person’s life. A clinically depressed person, however, is understood as a person with a chemical imbalance, that is, that has a clinical condition. Therefore, a distinction between non-clinical and clinical is justified when considering the very different implications of the usages.
6.3 Blending “A human is depressed”

As shown in Table 12, depressed is mainly used as either a clinical adjective (48.6% of the time) or in its non-clinical sense ‘miserable’ (45.1% of the time). Both these senses of the adjectives modify a human in over 90% of the material and, therefore, a blending diagram of the sentence “a human is depressed” is presented. The input space constituting the mental space for depressed is referred to as Input space 1 and the input space for the human is referred to as Input space 2. The blending diagram can be used both when tracing a clinical and a non-clinical usage since very similar elements seem to be in play with both usages.

The data showed that both the clinical and non-clinical usages of depressed seemed to refer to the clinical condition of depression. If so, the concept depression could arguably be a part of Input space 1. According to FrameNet, depression evokes the frame [MEDICAL CONDITION], which has the core frame elements Patient and Ailment. The Ailment that is called for is depression and the role of the Patient is related to a person in Input space 1. The Ailment is arguably further connected within Input space 1 to emotions of sadness. The relation between depression and sadness is a cause-effect relation where the Ailment is causing the sad emotions (or possibly the other way around). Depression is also connected to the person by a property relation because the concept calls for a person that is experiencing the depression.

Input space 2 carries the person of the statement. The person of the utterance is connected to the person in Input space 1 by an identity relation. Moreover, since the person in Input space 1 is connected to the Patient, the person in Input space 2 is also indirectly connected to the role of Patient. Compression occurs and in the blend, the structure of person as Patient is projected. Also, Input space 2 contains contextual information regarding the person. This information is a
part in determining whether the blend runs as a person suffering from clinical depression or as a person being sad. A property relation connects the person and this contextual information in the input space. That they are connected by this relation makes it salient that the contextual information regards the particular person, either in a straightforward fashion, as in the clinical sense or an extended way, as in the non-clinical sense. Moreover, a cause-effect relation connects the contextual information to the sad emotions in Input space 1. To illustrate, the person might have just experienced a political election that left them unsatisfied, as in example (10). That would bring about a cause-effect relationship between the sadness in Input space 1 and the political situation in Input space 2. This relation is then compressed into a property of sadness in the blended space. On the contrary, if Input space 2 contains contextual information that the person have a chemical imbalance (or other medical information) that have a cause-effect relation to the sadness in Input space 1, the property that emerge in the blend is not one of sadness but rather one of clinical depression.

The vital relations that can be perceived are an identity relation between the person in the input spaces, property relations between the person in Input space 1 and depression and between the person in Input space 2 and the contextual information, and cause-effect relations between the Ailment and the sad emotions and between the contextual information and the sad emotions. The identity relations between the person in the input spaces, and in extension the role of Patient, are compressed and scaled down to one perceived entity, which is that the person is a Patient. This is projected onto the blend. Furthermore, the property relation between the information and the person is also scaled, into an understanding in the blend where the information is a part of the person. The person carries the information. The cause-effect relations are also scaled into sharp and clearly identifiable causation links, making the connection clearer than it might have been in the inputs. The cause-effect relation between the contextual information and the emotions and also the property relation between the contextual information and the person is compressed into a single property relation between the emotion and the person.

That the person is the Patient is arguably a part of an emergent structure in the blend. When the blend is elaborated, the element gains the element of suffering. When people hear the utterance, they usually understand that the person in the utterance is suffering, in one way or the other. Furthermore, the cause-effect relation where the contextual information is causing the sad emotions is compressed into the person in the blend being perceived as having the essential property depressed. To be exact, the blend contains an inner-space relation of property.

In conclusion, by constructing a blending diagram for the utterance “a person is depressed” with basis in a collection of corpus data, it is possible to trace some relations and elements that are probable components when humans construct meaning behind the utterance. By studying a blending diagram of the utterance, it is apparent that one does not simply assign the property of depressed onto the person. The different input spaces show that the different lexical units contain more than a conventional meaning and that these additional elements are a part of the emergent meaning of the utterance. The input spaces show the importance of the contextual information and how that guides meaning construction. “A person is depressed” can
be understood as either a clinical or non-clinical utterance, what guides the meaning construction is what additional information is collected.

7 Discussion

The study found that lame was used in a non-clinical way in 93.5% of the data and that insane and depressed were used in non-clinical ways in respectively 88.2% and 51.4% of the data. That is, lame and insane were predominantly used in a non-clinical way while the use of depressed was quite equally divided between a non-clinical and clinical sense. For a further understanding of the non-clinical usages of the adjectives, subordinate categories were formed based on the data and lame had two subordinate categories, ‘lacking power’ and ‘lacking social prestige’, insane had three, ‘mentally deranged’, ‘stupid’ and ‘extreme’, and depressed had two, ‘miserable’ and ‘economically challenged’. These categories helped to shed light on nuances in the material not necessarily given by the dictionary definitions. The OED did, for example, not treat the different usages of insane with respect to positive or negative value and all instances of extremity or unbelievability were treated as the same sense of the adjective. This difference in value was found to be important while studying the data.

The first instance of lame is dated to 725 while insane and depressed have their first instances dated to 1575 and 1621. In other words, lame has been a part of the English language at least about 800 years longer than the other adjectives. The study concludes that lame is the adjective that is used with least reference to the clinical condition. While the different non-clinical senses of insane and depressed in quite evident ways draw from the clinical conditions of insanity and depression, lame has not a similar explanation. In this study, the usage of non-clinical lame has been attempted to account for with the help of an entrenched metaphor that underlie the usages of the adjective. The other adjectives did not call for similar treatment since their usages had the earlier mentioned connection to the clinical conditions in question. However, insane had a more extended use than depressed, even if they both draw from their respective clinical condition. Insane is an archaic clinical adjective, like lame, which arguably is a further reason for their extended use. Depressed is productive as a clinical adjective and accordingly, its extended usage is restricted.

Depressed predominantly modified humans in all senses except ‘economically challenged’ depressed. The same pattern of a dominant modified cannot be found with the other adjectives. In the non-clinical use of lame and insane, most senses modified four of the five categories, namely human, inanimate objects, verbal nouns and actions. ‘Mentally deranged’ insane modified all five categories but almost 90% of the time, the modifyee was human. However, the clinical use of all the adjectives was commonly used to modify humans. The different senses of the adjectives modified members of the different categories to different extents, which is commented upon in the presentation of the material but also accounted for in the blending diagrams.

The categories used in the analysis of the modifyee were created based on the data. For the study, they functioned well but if the study had been more concerned with the individual
instances of the modifyee, other categories might have been needed. For example, the
categorization in this study did not specify abstract and concrete objects, which led to the
inanimate objects category containing many different kinds of objects. Having more specific
categories might have helped an analysis of the different instances of the modifyee and the usage
of the adjectives. However, to show nuances within the category, examples from the corpus was
used and general nuances found in the processing of the data were commented upon.
Nevertheless, for the aim of this study, the categories for the modifyee served their purpose since
a more specific account of the different modified objects were not aimed for.

The corpus study found instances of fixed expressions (lame duck and ‘economically
challenged’ depressed) that were not discussed in an extensive way and not accounted for in the
blending diagrams. It is possible to construct quite detailed blending diagrams from fixed
expression because the usage is limited to some specific areas and registers. However, the focus
of this study was to identify and account for the non-clinical usages of the adjectives on a more
general level. The fixed expressions were included since they were still relevant to the
understanding of the usage of the adjectives but to delve into them was outside the aim of the
study. Further, a new expression that cannot be considered a fixed expression was found, lame
stream media. This expression also helped in the understanding of the usage of non-clinical lame
but to investigate the blend behind the expression was also outside the aim of this study.

It was possible to account for some of the usages with the help of CBT. In the study, the
blending diagrams were constructed and they were able to outline elements, relations and
processes that are highly probable to be a part of the blending process when the adjectives are
used in non-clinical ways. The construction of blending diagrams as an attempt to account for
different usages of adjectives had a limited and quite general function. Nevertheless, by
constructing blending diagrams, it is possible to map conceptual information that is recruited by
the linguistic forms and their relations in the meaning construction.

The blending diagrams are constructed based on artificial utterances of an “x is y” form.
Expect for being, as stated, artificial examples of linguistic utterances, the form of the utterance
also restrains the blending process that can be accounted for. In natural speech, an adjective
seldom modifies something by merely stating that the modifyee is the adjective. This directs the
blending to containing compression where the final product should be that the adjective is fused
as an essential property of the modifyee. In addition, the general construction of the utterances
leads to an account of no other words than the very general linguistic forms. Usually, when
uttering statements, the sentence before and after helps to contextualize and this has not been
accounted for in this study.

The study aimed to unite a usage-based approach with a cognitive semantic approach to
language. The blending diagrams were therefore based on the results of the corpus study. The
corpus data was, of course, diverse and the blending diagrams can merely account for the most
abstracted usages of the adjectives. By studying usage, the construction of blending diagrams is,
however, less generic and more probable accounts of the cognitive processes. As already stated,
the general utterances that the blending diagrams are based upon are restrictive. On the other
hand, without a basis in the corpus study, neither the different senses of the adjectives nor the
adjectives’ probable modified would have been outlined. By consulting a corpus, some nuances
in the usage were presented such as that ‘stupid’ *insane* usually modified legal systems or things
with creators and that *depressed* had a clear connection to the clinical condition, whether it was
used clinically or non-clinically. A way to further base the construction of blending diagrams in
the corpus would have been to construct the blending diagrams from different examples in the
corpus that were found to be representative.

The present study bears similarities to research conducted by Lundmark (2005), Pascual
(2002) and Coulson (2001). Lundmark approached advertising by using both conceptual
metaphor and CBT, similar to the approach used in 4.3, when discussing the blending process of
*lame*. However, while Lundmark’s blending diagrams were based on factual advertisements, the
blending diagrams in this study were based on artificial utterances. Also, Pascual’s (2002)
blending diagram was based on an utterance taken from a factual trial. Coulson’s (2001)
blending argument, however, was more similar to this study in that the phenomena studied were
artificial. Pascual and Coulson employed frame semantics when constructing blending diagrams,
which is a similarity with the present study.

One of the disadvantages in this study was that the generalized utterances made the
blending diagrams restricted in their function. The research of Lundmark (2005) and Pascual
(2002) strengthens that claim since they, with their more specific input as basis for blending
diagrams, were able to construct more specific and well-founded blending diagrams. However,
the blending diagrams in the present study functioned well when the aim was to trace the relation
to clinical conditions. The generalized utterances can be a start of approaching this kind of
phenomena where clinical conditions are guiding the meaning construction of adjectives. This
research could be extended by looking at corpus-based examples or the use of the clinical
adjectives within a specific register. Further, more clinical adjectives could be analyzed in a
similar way and the result could then be compared to see if there is any connection between, for
example, the usage and meaning construction of clinical adjectives connected to mental
conditions in contrast to clinical adjectives connected to physical conditions.

In conclusion, the study have mapped the usage of the adjectives *lame, insane* and
*depressed*. The clinical condition behind each adjective was connected to the extended usages to
different extents. *Lame* had least connection to the clinical condition and *depressed* the closest
connection. The study has found that the linguistic phenomena at hand were accounted for well
by uniting a usage-based approach and a cognitive semantic approach. The nuances that could be
traced by studying the corpus helped the construction of the blending diagrams and the different
stages of the study were therefore helped by each other. CBT was helpful for explaining and
tracing the impact of the clinical conditions on the usage. The study concludes that the use of
clinical adjectives is more diverse and complex than might be apparent at first glance: conceptual
blending and entrenched metaphors underlie the usage. Finally, the study shows the wide
applicability of CBT when approaching language and it shows that language use seldom is as
simple as it might seem.
References


FrameNet. https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu


36

