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An argument for incompatibilism
2008 (English)Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
Abstract [en]

The consequence argument for incompatibilism, the position that we lack free will, in one version depends on the concept of ‘rendering a proposition false’. If we can give one single definition of this concept such that all premises are true, the conclusion is true as well. John Perry has proposed one definition, which he argues makes the argument false. In this paper I argue that this definition is sufficient for all premises to be true, and that the conclusion thereby is true. Furthermore I consider an argument of my own for incompatibilism. I examine what possible ways there are to deny the arguments for incompatibilism, and conclude that the arguments are solid. Moreover, I argue that two popular positions for denying incompatibilism are both false, and that a weaker concept of ability is not a ground for denying the consequence argument.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Keyword [en]
Humanities Theology
Keyword [sv]
Humaniora, Teologi
URN: urn:nbn:se:ltu:diva-50400ISRN: LTU-CUPP--08/267--SELocal ID: 7aaebf7c-cc22-4353-9cee-64ec7fd63782OAI: diva2:1023759
Subject / course
Student thesis, at least 15 credits
Educational program
Philosophy, bachelor's level
Validerat; 20101217 (root)Available from: 2016-10-04 Created: 2016-10-04Bibliographically approved

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