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Is total system cost minimization fair to all the actors of an energy system? Not according to game theory
Luleå University of Technology, Department of Engineering Sciences and Mathematics, Energy Science.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-6774-7131
Luleå University of Technology, Department of Engineering Sciences and Mathematics, Energy Science.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-4532-4530
2022 (English)In: Energy, ISSN 0360-5442, E-ISSN 1873-6785, Vol. 239, no Part C, article id 122253Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

A common approach to energy system optimization is to minimize overall costs at system level, regardless of the actors actually bearing those costs. This paper presents an approach inspired by Nash game theory concepts, in which the actors involved in an energy system determine their optimal strategies according to their own economic interests (profit functions) in a non-cooperative or in a cooperative way. A simple case study, considering an electric utility and individual heating consumers in the municipal energy system of a small town in northern Sweden, shows the differences between the two approaches. The game theory approach is able to represent more realistic interactions among the actors of an energy system, fair in fulfilling their conflicting economic interests, and, therefore, a more suitable tool for decision makers evaluating the impacts of policy instruments.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2022. Vol. 239, no Part C, article id 122253
Keywords [en]
Energy system optimization, Game theory, Profit functions, Nash equilibrium, Nash bargaining solution, Policy instruments
National Category
Energy Engineering
Research subject
Energy Engineering
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:ltu:diva-87437DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2021.122253ISI: 000711163200014Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85116893248OAI: oai:DiVA.org:ltu-87437DiVA, id: diva2:1601428
Note

Validerad;2021;Nivå 2;2021-10-14 (beamah)

Available from: 2021-10-08 Created: 2021-10-08 Last updated: 2021-11-08Bibliographically approved

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Fischer, RobertToffolo, Andrea

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CiteExportLink to record
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Output format
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