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Cooperation and partnering in facilities construction: empirical application of prisoner's dilemma
Luleå University of Technology, Department of Business Administration, Technology and Social Sciences, Innovation and Design.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-1746-2637
2007 (English)In: Facilities, ISSN 0263-2772, E-ISSN 1758-7131, Vol. 25, no 1/2, p. 7-19Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Purpose - To investigate if game theoretic reasoning may be used to explain a lack of cooperation in buyer-supplier relationships within construction and facilities management. In order to make an empirical application of the Prisoner's dilemma game possible important variables are operationalized and empirically measured Methodology/approach - Empirical data concerning pay-offs and the variables in the discount parameter formula (created in this paper) have been obtained through interviews with clients and contractors in the Swedish construction sector. Findings - This paper suggests a way to operationalize pay-offs and the discount parameter, making empirical measurements possible. Due to differences in pay-offs and the discount parameter, different forms of contracts will affect cooperation. Cumulative values of cooperation are much higher in lasting relationships than in occasional transactions. Thus, the best way to facilitate cooperation between rational players is long-term contracts.Research limitations/implications - Since the values used are based on empirical data collected from a few respondents, they should be viewed as illustrative empirical examples, rather than statistical generalizations.Practical implications - From a game theoretic perspective the practice of project partnering may not solve problems regarding lack of cooperation. To increase the incentives for cooperation the actors should work together in long-term relationships instead of focusing on single projects. Long-term strategic partnering is therefore beneficial for the construction and management of facilities.Originality/value - This paper makes empirical application of the Prisoner's Dilemma game possible by operationalizing and empirically measuring game theoretic variables that previously have been given values set by the researcher rather than by the players in the game.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2007. Vol. 25, no 1/2, p. 7-19
National Category
Other Engineering and Technologies not elsewhere specified
Research subject
Entrepreneurship and Innovation
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:ltu:diva-3812DOI: 10.1108/02632770710716902Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-33846662586Local ID: 1a660140-6a9b-11dc-9e58-000ea68e967bOAI: oai:DiVA.org:ltu-3812DiVA, id: diva2:976673
Note
Validerad; 2007; 20070924 (pererik)Available from: 2016-09-29 Created: 2016-09-29 Last updated: 2018-07-10Bibliographically approved

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Eriksson, Per-Erik

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