Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
An Online Mechanism for Resource Allocation and Pricing in Clouds
Department of Computer Science, Wayne State University, Detroit.
Department of Computer Science, Wayne State University, Detroit.
Department of Computer Science, Wayne State University, Detroit.
Luleå University of Technology, Department of Computer Science, Electrical and Space Engineering, Computer Science.ORCID iD: 0000-0003-1902-9877
2016 (English)In: I.E.E.E. transactions on computers (Print), ISSN 0018-9340, E-ISSN 1557-9956, Vol. 65, no 4, p. 1172-1184Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Cloud providers provision their various resources such as CPUs, memory, and storage in the form of virtual machine (VM) instances which are then allocated to the users. The users are charged based on a pay-as-you-go model, and their payments should be determined by considering both their incentives and the incentives of the cloud providers. Auction markets can capture such incentives, where users name their own prices for their requested VMs. We design an auction-based online mechanism for VM provisioning, allocation, and pricing in clouds that considers several types of resources. Our proposed online mechanism makes no assumptions about future demand of VMs, which is the case in real cloud settings. The proposed online mechanism is invoked as soon as a user places a request or some of the allocated resources are released and become available. The mechanism allocates VM instances to selected users for the period they are requested for, and ensures that the users will continue using their VM instances for the entire requested period. In addition, the mechanism determines the payment the users have to pay for using the allocated resources. We prove that the mechanism is incentive-compatible, that is, it

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016. Vol. 65, no 4, p. 1172-1184
National Category
Media and Communication Technology
Research subject
Mobile and Pervasive Computing
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:ltu:diva-9526DOI: 10.1109/TC.2015.2444843ISI: 000372752600015Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-84963768851Local ID: 82dec644-87be-47f8-b909-4f0e17f3dd7bOAI: oai:DiVA.org:ltu-9526DiVA, id: diva2:982464
Note

Validerad; 2016; Nivå 2; 20160418 (andbra)

Available from: 2016-09-29 Created: 2016-09-29 Last updated: 2018-07-10Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text in DiVA

Other links

Publisher's full textScopus

Authority records BETA

Vasilakos, Athanasios

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Vasilakos, Athanasios
By organisation
Computer Science
In the same journal
I.E.E.E. transactions on computers (Print)
Media and Communication Technology

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar

doi
urn-nbn

Altmetric score

doi
urn-nbn
Total: 32 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf