Environmental concerns about carbon emissions coupled with the oil industry’s need to secure additional CO₂ for enhanced oil recovery (CO₂-EOR) projects have sparked interest in the potential that CO₂-EOR may have in jumpstarting carbon capture and sequestration (CCS). However, existing studies on the viability of coupling CO₂-EOR with CCS have generally placed more focus on either the engineering or economic aspects of the problem. Most engineering studies focus on the technical aspects of the CO₂-EOR project to produce the maximum amount of oil, while simultaneously storing the most CO₂ during the production process with the economics as an afterthought, while most economic studies found have focused on a singular aspect of the issue such as impacts of exogenously varying injection rates. Furthermore, modelling efforts have stopped at the end of the productive life of the field. We build a unique two-stage dynamic optimization model, which simultaneously addresses engineering and economic policy aspects, to study the viability of coupling CO₂-EOR transitioning into CCS. Our model includes a carbon tax for emissions, which becomes a subsidy for full scale sequestration after oil production has ceased; this allows us to explore the transition from CO₂-EOR, our first stage, to sole CO₂ sequestration in our second stage for a single field. We maximize the operator’s profits across both stages, while tracking the responsiveness of oil production and total carbon movements to both price and policy changes. We pair our optimization model with a reservoir simulation model, allowing us to mimic actual field behavior, giving our work a more realistic representation of both production and sequestration profiles. Our results suggest that small increases in the level of carbon tax can have large and discontinuous impacts on net sequestration. This stems from the observed transition from limited natural sources of CO₂ to more expensive captured CO₂ resulting from the implemented policy. With appropriate taxes, total volumes of captured CO₂ sequestered across both stages are equivalent to 30 to 40% of the emissions from the use of the oil produced. With the credits oil producers receive from sequestering CO₂, which equate to the tax, relatively high carbon taxes incentivize additional sequestration without significantly impacting the supply of oil. This, alongside maintaining a steady stream of profits, is a win-win situation for energy security and the climate.

The aim with this article is to discuss how changes in technology at workplaces engender both change and restoration of gender constructions within the context of underground mining. The discussions are formed around a constructed case based on material from gender and organizational studies of large-scale industrial mines in different countries, most of them from Sweden. New technologies such as digitalization and automation together with new organizational forms engender changes in mining work, e.g., new types of work tasks, new competence demands, and a move from underground to high-tech control rooms aboveground. One main observation is that the changes challenge the old and recalcitrant blue-collar mining masculinity. On the one hand, the organizational resistance and “lagging” seemed to result in re-gendering and restoration of the male dominance. On the other hand, there were tendencies to adaptation in the workplace cultures, including new ways of forming mining masculinities, perhaps even undoing of gender. The main conclusion is that the most probable development lies somewhere in-between and by analyzing such complex processes of gender, technology, and change future research can get more knowledge of changes of gender constructions in working life.

The shale gas and oil revolution has unexpectedly and forcefully begun to change the energy landscape in the USA. It is expected to spread beyond the USA, with far reaching implications for the global energy map, but also for the macroeconomy and politics of many countries. The purpose of this paper is to bring a better understanding to what prompted the revolution, to assess the production methods and associated environmental concerns, to speculate what can reasonably be expected in coming decades, and to sketch the full impact of a ripening shale revolution on the emerging economic and political policy choices for energy exporting and importing countries. We find that a large scale expansion can be expected in US shale gas and oil activities in the coming two decades. Globally, the shale leaders are likely to be countries that are already significant gas and oil producers. Setting up a policy framework to allow and promote shale development in a safe manner is a necessity for the launch of shale exploitation. The most important implication of a successful shale revolution would arguably be a downward pressure on gas and coal prices in regional markets and on the global oil price.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the efficiency of the global primary aluminum industry. Efficiency is here taken to be evaluated relative to some benchmark, i.e., the smelter or smelters identified as the most efficient in the data set, thus forming the production frontier. The performance of individual smelters, specifically their technical, allocative, and scale efficiencies are calculated by the means of data envelopment analysis. A proprietary database containing data on inputs used, output, and cost of production for 151 primary aluminum smelters operational globally in 2003 were used in the efficiency estimations. In order to assess and contrast the performance of smelters at different locations, facing dissimilar policy and factor supply environments, smelters are grouped into geographical regions. Furthermore, the technology used will also be evaluated in terms of the above efficiency measures. For each region, measures of potential technical and cost-wise factor savings will be calculated in order to assess specifically in what way production factors improvements can be made and approximately how large these improvements are. The findings indicate that; (a) smelters are overall highly efficient given the scale of operation, (b) many smelters operate with increasing returns to scale and thus we find significant scale inefficiencies, (c) substantial allocative inefficiencies exist within the industry, and (d) there are significant variations in the level of efficiency across regions. The allocative efficiency is particularly low in regions such as China and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region. Finally, the greatest potential for factor reductions is in labor input in China, the CIS region and in Asia.

Several large scenario exercises in the last years present decarbonizing transitional energy pathways to 2050 and beyond. This changing energy landscape toward net zero is new territory to explore but is expected to be more intensive in mineral based materials than the current system. Mapping this territory and understanding the critical material needs to support the transition are essential for demanders and suppliers as well as policy makers seeking to orchestrate the transition. Our contribution is to provide such decision makers for electricity markets with a transparent tool that can be easily understood and modified as our transitional knowledge improves. In this tool, we take the International Energy Agency’s conservative Beyond Two Degrees scenario, which projects renewable energy penetration for 15 electricity technologies, supplemented by Bloomberg’s Electrical Vehicle Outlook. Coupling these electricity projections with estimates of material use per GW of new capacity, we estimate resulting needs for 33 materials through 2050. Assuming constant material intensities and recycle rates, our model finds dramatic increases in most included materials from 2021 to 2050. The total projected tonnage increases in materials used for the transition is 294% with a compounded average annual growth rate of 4.8%. However, there is wide heterogeneity across materials (from slightly negative for tungsten to nearly 1300% for lithium). Projected 2050 sales vary from less than 30 tonnes for hafnium and yttrium (with quantity demanded growth of − 4.8% from 2021 to 2050) to more than 17 million tonnes for steel (with growth of 291%) and aluminum (growth 419%). At 2021 prices, 2050 sales revenue varies from less than a million dollars for boron (growth of 164%) to more than $42 billion for aluminum (growth 419%), nickel (growth of 279%), and steel (growth of 291%).

Depletion of minerals and other non-renewable resources has long been a source of worry to industrial economies. This worry waxes when markets are tight and wanes when they are not. However, evidence has continued to mount that there are staggering amounts of minerals in space that are technically within our grasp. Scientific work has considered mineral availability and technical ability to mine on near earth objects. Within the last decade, a number of space related industries have gained attention. While availability and technical feasibility are both necessary conditions for this industry to develop, they are not sufficient. Rather sufficiency also requires financial feasibility. Although studies have considered the costs of mining asteroids, we are aware of no papers that model the effects on terrestrial mineral market structure with the injection of extra-terrestrial minerals. Our contribution is to consider the current state of mineral markets and provide a model of firm entry to derive implications to the market from space mined minerals entering the market. We provide a numerical simulation to demonstrate what prices asteroidal entrants might face for the injection of a variety of metals and provide an online model for others to change inputs to their asteroid and metals of choice.

This paper reports the main results of an assessment of the local and regional economic benefits of a new large-scale iron ore project that is currently being developed by Northland Resources in northern Sweden. Specifically, the mine is located in Pajala—a municipality of approximately 6,300 residents in Norrbotten County in northern Sweden. We employ the Swedish regional impact model rAps to estimate the local and regional benefits of the project, focusing mainly on the employment opportunities created by multiplier effects. The rAps-system links an input–output model of regional production with a demographic model of net migration and commuting. This allows us to use a scenario-based approach and simulate the impact of different demographic assumptions, which are key determinants of the magnitude of local benefits. The local labour supply is limited and if most of the workers are non-residents who commute, much of the household incomes generated by the project flow out of Pajala and benefit other municipalities in the region. Our results indicate that the local employment multiplier for Pajala varies between 1.4 to 1.6 depending on the demographic assumptions, but the effect on local incomes is limited if labour demand is serviced mainly by commuters from other municipalities. The estimated regional employment multiplier for Norrbotten County is approximately 1.7, reflecting that the bigger and more diverse regional economy is better equipped to supply inputs to mineral development projects.

The concept of declining availability due to declining primary resource quality has been investigated for various resource categories to try to determine the effort needed in future to either extract the resource or to treat it for intended use. The concept of ‘future efforts’ due to declining primary resource quality is explored by Vieira et al. (2016, 2017). They suggest that a specific burden associated with the production of each primary material should be taken into account and that this can be done by studying the costs of production or ore requirements of the material and by projecting forward likely costs into the future. For the purpose of the analysis, they employ mine cost data for 2000–2013 and reserve data published by the US Geological Survey. We will argue below that this approach is not correct and, with this comment, we wish to make it clear that—contrary to what is suggested in much of the Life Cycle Assessment literature—the future efforts concept is not an established rule of natural resource extraction. For mineral resources, it is quite impossible to proceed with extraction in the ordered way that this approach suggests because nobody has a comprehensive view of the entire natural resource. Secondly, there is no evidence available to support the idea that extracting a mineral resource today causes a decrease in availability of that mineral tomorrow. On the contrary, the weight of evidence suggests that where declines in ore grades have been observed, they are overwhelmingly due to technology development in response to high demand and have been accompanied by increased mining efficiency and increased availability of the resource to successive generations. Grade is a rather arbitrary measure since the grade of mined ore ultimately has to do with the relationship of costs and revenues. It is not only the technology employed which matters but also how smartly this technology is applied. Thirdly, the future efforts approach entirely overlooks the potential availability of mineral materials from secondary (scrap) sources, sources which are expected to become increasingly important to mineral supply in the future. Our conclusion from the discussion is that we as humans have been able to economically access ever-increasing amounts of material from often lower and lower-grade sources. What is impossible to conclude from this is that the environment no longer contains any of the higher-grade sources. In fact, all the available evidence suggests that higher-grade deposits are still out there. We remain critical optimists.

This study was initiated to address the importance of properly functioning African geological surveys. Africa’s current developmental needs require a robust geoscientific infrastructure and knowledge that can only be achieved through well-developed geological surveys. A geoscientific infrastructure covers a wide range of geo-related areas, e.g. geological mapping, geophysical surveys and geochemical analyses that are needed for a variety of purposes, such as exploration, land-use planning, water resource assessment etc. Many geological surveys in Africa lack human, material and economic resources and therefore cannot perform their work effectively. The questionnaire used as a base for this study was made by Danièle Barberis (French) and Susanne Gylesjö (English). Compilation of the data and the report was performed by Susanne Gylesjö with assistance from Magnus Ericsson.

The unprecedented mineral and metal boom beginning in 2004/5 and peaking in 2011 exposed European economic vulnerability and the continent's high dependence on imported raw materials. The almost limitless Chinese appetite for metals and minerals together with Chinese control over certain metals of strategic importance (nowadays called critical metals), such as the rare earths, further exacerbated the situation. European politicians and bureaucrats were caught unaware of the seemingly low security of supply for European industry. Not surprising, as during the two last decades of the twentieth century, the European Commission had been trying to limit damages caused by the crumbling European mining sector, primarily coal but also other minerals and metals, and had not been thinking about future supply issues at all. But since then the Commission has slowly but steadily revved its mineral raw material policies into action. The European actions are carried out under a range of acronyms, and for the non-European reader, it might be useful to present these in some detail, with a focus on R&I (research & innovation) aspects, as a background to this issue of Mineral Economics.

The world’s dependency on cobalt mines in Congo and cobalt refineries in China is seen as serious security issues with potentially dangerous implications for the energy transition. However, Chinese refineries have a similar supply security issue as most of its cobalt concentrates are imported. Most supply security studies take a country perspective on market concentration and supply risks. However, control of the mines and refineries lies with the producing companies, not the governments of the countries where they are located. This paper analyses the corporate structure of the cobalt industry at the mine and the refinery stages over a longer time period to establish changes in the level of corporate concentration and to put the situation in 2018 in perspective. The level of corporate concentration at the mine stage is low and does not raise concerns for market failures or a lack of competitiveness. Corporate concentration of refined cobalt depends on the Chinese government’s influence over Chinese production: if the state control over individual refineries is assumed to be strong, the corporate concentration is high. Mine stage supply security could be strengthened by improving the general political stability in the DRC to make the country more attractive for investors other than the present ones. Increased local beneficiation would strongly benefit Congo and reduce China’s influence. This is a long and complicated process and its success is not at all certain. At the refinery stage, the solution is much easier: reliability of supply could be improved by constructing refineries in countries outside China.

In several low- and middle-income countries rich in non-fuel mineral resources, mining makes significant contributions to national economic development as measured by the revised Mining Contribution Index (MCI-Wr). Ten countries among the 20 countries where mining contributes most (highest MCI-Wr score) have moved up one or two steps in the World Bank’s country classification between 1996 and 2016. In particular, African countries have benefitted. Socio-economic development indicators also show signs of progress for African mineral-rich countries. This paper provides an update and expansion of an earlier study within the framework of the United Nations University (UNU) World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) initiative Extractives for Development. Based on the detailed data available for the sector, such as production, export, prices, mineral rents, exploration expenditure and government revenues, an analysis is carried out of the current situation for 2016, and trends in mining’s contribution to economic development for the years 1996–2016. The contribution of minerals and mining to GDP and exports reached a maximum at the peak of the mining boom in 2011. Naturally, the figures for mining’s contribution had declined for most countries by 2016, but importantly the levels were still considerably higher than in 1996. The results of this survey contradict the widespread view that mineral resources create a dependency that might not be conducive to economic and social development. In addition, this paper presents an attempt to use already available socio-economic indicators for African mineral-rich countries to measure socio-economic developments. One preliminary conclusion of this survey is that mining countries perform better than oil-producing countries and non-mineral countries in Africa as measured by these indices of human development and governance.

Chinese companies are far from taking control over African or global mining. In 2018, they control less than 7% of the value of total African mine production. Chinese investments in African mining of non-fuel minerals between 1995 and 2018 have contributed to production growth but it has also increased Chinese control over African mineral and metal production. There is evidence pointing to a continued Chinese expansion in African minerals and metals but at a slower pace than in the past decade. Through a detailed analysis of every mine, fully or partially controlled by Chinese interest in Africa and all other parts of the world the paper also measures total Chinese control over global mine production to be around 3% of the total value.

It is a well-known fact that mine production has shifted from the industrialised countries of Europe, North America and Japan to emerging economies in Latin America, Africa and Asia and to Australia since the mid-20th century. The lack of self-sufficiency or high import dependence, in particular of the so-called critical metals, has become an issue of great political concern in these industrialised countries over the past 15 years. This study of six metals, cobalt, copper, iron ore, lithium, manganese and rare earths, contrasts this picture of geographical location of production with an analysis of where the control over mine production around the world is based, which we call the locus of control. Production might have moved out of the industrialised countries but control over production by companies based in the industrialised countries remains and has even increased between 1985 and 2018. We measure control as share of the total value of the production of the six metals. European transnational mining companies have increased their control from 14 to 18% while mining companies based in North America have lost control, a decline from 13 to 8%. When Australian companies, that have more than tripled their control in the same period, are added, control by the industrialised countries has increased to 44% of these six metals. Companies based in Latin America, Africa and Asia excluding China, taken together have maintained their control level, roughly a third of the total value of the six metals. Inside this group of countries African share has dwindled from 12 to 3% while Asian companies have more than doubled their share from 5 to 12%. Control by mining companies based in the republics of the former Soviet Union have been reduced from 25 to 7% while in the same period Chinese companies’ control has doubled from 6 to 12% of the total value of these six metals. Countries in Asia (excluding China) together with Latin American and African countries produce 51% of these six metals measured by the value at the mine stage. However, companies based in these countries control not more than 33% of the production.

The platinum group mining industry is among the most concentrated of all metal mining industries. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for palladium is 2413 in 2014, on the threshold to what is defined as “highly concentrated”. When considering that production is also concentrated in a few countries, more than 80 % of total world production is mined in South Africa and Russia, it is obvious that platinum group metals (PGMs) are labelled “critical” by many governments such as the EU, Japan and the USA (EU Commission 2014; National Research Council 2008; Prime Minister of Japan 2015). The development of the corporate structure for PGMs is analysed. Into the future, it looks as if the degree of concentration will decrease.

This paper adds new knowledge on how raw materials should be managed in iron and steelmaking firms. While previous research has contributed significantly to how firms should deal with functional challenges related to raw materials, the understanding of Raw Materials Management from a holistic perspective is largely lacking, and extant research does not provide qualified advice to firms on this matter. This study provides such knowledge by drawing on insights from Höganäs AB, a world leader in ferrous powder metallurgy, and their efforts to identify key aspects and principles of raw materials management. Our elaboration of a more holistic view on raw materials management builds on two elements. First, we depict five external uncertainties and three internal conditions that impact firm-level raw materials management. Second, we present six critical capabilities that underpin proficient firm-level raw materials management. The paper concludes with a discussion of implications for both firms aiming to increase their raw materials proficiency and to future investigations into this important area.

The continuation and increasing importance of mining is inevitable as society embraces both the transition to a low-carbon economy and application of circular economy concepts. However, across many parts of society, there is an ongoing sense that those who are carrying many of the costs and risks related to mining particularly over the long term (often host communities and countries) are not seeing a level of benefit that seems fair. In contrast, there is frustration within the industry that mining is not being given due credit for the importance of its role in contemporary society by those who would criticize industry practices. Over the past several decades, dozens of initiatives aimed at strengthening mining's social and environmental performance have been mounted from both within and outside the industry. These generally depend on a "leadership-trickle-down" change model. While progress has been achieved, the society-industry trust deficit continues. The global mining community comprises a corporate core and a complex range of other surrounding interests. We suggest that some key questions regarding the nature of this community and its appetite and capacity for change have not been explored thus impeding the effectiveness of change management. We offer (1) an estimate of the number of companies that lie at the core of the global mining community: some 25,000 operating in about 140 countries (using data from the mid-2010s); (2) a profile of these companies as an initial step towards understanding the "culture" of the global mining community; and (3) a listing of additional complexities and observations important to bringing global-wide improvement to mining's social and environmental performance. We argue that building on work to date, a fresh approach is required. We are calling for a dialog to reflect on the ideas presented here, refine them as appropriate, and develop the needed strategies and action plans. Such a process must build from a comprehensive understanding of the global mining community and its culture. It must be collaborative in nature and involve not only the range of mining companies but also with surrounding interests and governments. If this is not done, the change that is needed to align actions of all mining actors with social values will not occur and the trust deficit will remain.

This paper investigates whether shocks to copper consumption for 37 countries over the period 1967-2010 are transitory or persistent. A variety of time-series unit root tests is first employed. This is followed by several generations of panel data unit root tests. The presence of structural breaks is taken into account while performing those tests. In addition, cross-sectional dependence is detected and effectively controlled when applying some new generations of panel unit root tests. Copper consumption is found to follow a non-stationary process for about 86% of the countries. There is also overwhelming evidence of similar process when panel unit root tests are applied. Generally, shocks to copper consumption are found to be persistent.

Following the rush to minerals that would enable the shift towards green economies, the Sámi homeland is quickly becoming a crucible for the rising tensions surrounding the potential for new mining projects and large-scale infrastructure projects. The roots of these conflicts date back to the colonization of the north and continue in the present with the ongoing fight to maintain the Sámi heritage, language and culture, and increasingly to gain ownership of their lands. What initially began as activism within the legal system has, on occasions, transformed into outright protests. Social media increasingly plays a key role in disseminating the message of Indigenous protest among the protesters themselves and feeding into the national and international mainstream media. This shift occurs simultaneously with the construction of a dual narrative, constituted of both land-use protest and intensified demands for Indigenous rights, including, first and foremost, the right to self-determination. Drawing from Social media theory literature and the concepts of political opportunity structures (POS) and legal opportunity structures (LOS), this study argues that social media is one of the most essential tools used by Sámi activists to raise awareness about issue-based protests as well as to communicate demands for the right to self-determination when legal and political opportunity structures are not enough to support the cause. The power of social media lies in its accessibility, immediacy and visuality, which is illustrated in the article via specific examples of mining and railway construction protests in Finland and Sweden. Social media does not replace older tools, such as international human rights litigation, but their use can complement existing strategies for defending and advancing Indigenous rights. 

In recent years, Sweden and Finland both have experienced an exploration and mining boom, in particular, when comparing with the situation 10 years ago. The mining companies are once again highly profitable. A tax or royalty on produced mineral resources has been debated in both countries. The issue of ownership of minerals covered by the Mineral Acts is, however, not clear in any of the countries. Whether or not the State is regarded as the owner of minerals which are regulated by the Mining Acts, the State, however, does have a decisive influence on the exploration and extraction of mineral assets in Sweden and Finland. Ownership may also refer to holding of shares in a company exploring for or mining metals. In a broader context, the role of the State might be traced in mineral policies or strategies, which have been issued recently in several EU member states, Finland and Sweden included. This article, comparative in its nature, aims to investigate and analyse how the State in Sweden and Finland adjusts mineral rights and control of mining companies, and with a historical survey and a short international overview as a basis, the authors present a few observations on the role of the State for the countries’ future mineral strategies. In this article, the role of the State in Sweden and Finland is discussed in a historical context as to ownership of mineral resources, regulatory rules and control of mining and ownership of State-mining and/or exploration companies. The article shows that different roads have been chosen historically depending on the current view of State ownership in society. This also means that mineral strategies must be continuously updated, and actively incorporating the historical experiences. We believe that the role of the State, as an owner or controller of the two countries’ mineral resources and as regulator of exploration and mining activities, must be dealt with more thoroughly in both countries’ mineral strategies. We also believe that Sweden and Finland, sharing an overall positive experience from State ownership and control in all the ways discussed in this article, also must share and communicate this to other countries and international organisations: firstly, in the EU and the European Commission and secondly, outside the EU and Europe and within the UN and the African Union.

It is believed that most of the production problems in modern mining industry could be solved solely by applying technical tools such as better machinery, more accurate models or more advanced technology. Geometallurgy was initially introduced as a tool aimed to improve production performance by integrating geological and process information into a predictive model. However, the actual benefits of geometallurgy cannot be achieved without considering actors involved and strategic decisions made by the management in addition. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a framework of decision-making in which technical and managerial aspects of the geometallurgy are fully integrated. This framework is aimed to be used for improving predictability of the geometallurgical programmes.

The mining industry is facing a technological shift with Industry 4.0 creating new conditions for mining. This is often referred to as Mining 4.0. To succeed through the technological shift, the industry need to handle several challenges wisely, such as how to utilise the new digital technology to promote sustainable work environments, how to recruit skilled workers to the industry, and how to manage organisational challenges as a result of the technological shift. This scoping literature review examines a large field of literature on how Mining 4.0 might affect the mining industry in areas such as work environment, competences, organisation and society, and what can be done to promote sustainability going forward. The paper also identifies several areas that have not been explored in previous research. These include empirical studies on the effects of the technological shift brought about by Mining 4.0 on work environments, and how to attract younger generations to mining to ensure sustainability in the industry going forward.

In this study, an empirical model of global trade in iron ore is developed and applied. The empirical specification is based on the trade gravity theory in which the trade is determined by the income of the trading countries, the distance between the countries, and other characteristics of the countries. The model is specified allowing for country-specific effects. The estimation is performed with panel data for global bilateral iron ore trade flows from 1980 to 2016 including 121 countries and almost 14,000 observations. The results indicate a strong support of the gravity model hypotheses. On average, the trade value is projected to increase by approximately 5% per year up until 2035. The trade potential of iron ore is estimated to 410 million USD per year. Applied to forecasting and policy analysis, the results represent another worthwhile source of information providing an alternative view of the global trade in iron ore that can be helpful for decision-makers.

This paper takes its starting point in the fact that many mines have managed to improve its work environment, with regards to, for example, accident occurrence, while at the same time having stopped seeing improvements in these areas even in the wake of technology interventions. Technology projects in the mining industry continue to make claims on further improvements to the work environment, and make wider claims still, but have not addressed underlying causes that lead to underperformance of technology in terms of work environment improvements. This paper suggests that when we look closer at the situation, we find a complex situation in which negative and positive effects on the work environment follow the implementation of new technology. The analysis conducted in the paper further suggests that this has to do with mining environments having reached a level where historically major risks have been addressed; remaining risks, which are still significant, are of such a nature that their singular treatment — attempting to address these risks through isolated action such as new technology — engenders risks elsewhere. At the same time, the mining industry is of such a character that technological sophistications will fail to ultimately address the fundamental underlying causes of technology’s underperformance; technology by itself will never be enough. In part, this is due to constraints stemming from the characteristics of the mining industry, resulting in lower and slower technological progress for instance. The paper, thus, proposes a shift in focus with regards to technology, from technology itself to the processes surrounding the development, implementation, and use of technology in the mining industry. The paper, then, outlines some requirements for such a process.

The way in which mining contributes to job opportunities in the region where it takes place has become increasingly important for the industry’s relations to the local community. The employment impacts of mining are however far from straightforward to assess. Considering these uncertainties about real-life job impacts, it is vital that there are sound assessments of these employment effects. The purpose of this paper is to apply a novel econometric approach to assess mining-induced job multipliers in the empirical context of northern Sweden. This analysis employs data on the number of employees in selected non-mining sectors and in the mining sector, respectively, and covering the relatively recent mining boom period (2003-2013). We also highlight differences across the two main mining counties in northern Sweden. The results show a positive statistical relationship between increases in the number of employees in the mining sector and changes in the number of employees in other sectors. The private services sector is particularly affected, while the industrial sector also benefits in the specific case of mining municipalities. The results also indicate relatively large inter-county differences, in turn highlighting the importance of addressing the context-specific circumstances when estimating the employment effects of mining.

The mining industries of Sweden and Finland currently face several policy issues around investment, stakeholder involvement, and sustainability. Since the two countries garnered significant attention during the mining boom, research from a social sciences perspective grew significantly. One approach to understanding how these issues in Sweden and Finland compare to international examples is through an analysis of the policy development framework. Looking at three factors—institutions, actors, and process—gives a broad overview of the imminent challenges in both Sweden and Finland and potential lessons from existing research that point to similar problems and their solutions. As the mining operations continue to sit at the center of different values, capable policy is required.

We have collected and analysed grade information for nine metals: copper, gold, iron, lead, manganese, nickel, PGM, tin, and zinc. Based on this analysis, we have developed a proposal of “grade classes”, i.e., what could be considered low-grade, average-grade, and high-grade deposits for all these metals. We discuss the implications of possible developments into the future of the grades of ores, from which these metals are extracted. A focus on high-grade deposits will naturally reduce the environmental impact of mining. For six metals (copper, gold, iron, nickel, PGM, and zinc), we have further analysed the volumes available for the 10% cohort of projects and operating mines with the highest grades. Three metals (iron, PGM, and zinc) show considerable volumes, between 15 and 20% of total metal content in resources in this high-grade percentile. Copper and gold have between 5 and 10% while nickel has only 1.7% in the highest 10% grade percentile.

This text provides my praise for my oldest professional friend, John Tilton, as it has developed over more than 40 years through global interaction.

CSR needs to be implemented into every level of an organization to have a meaningful impact, and management systems are proven useful for CSR practice. Benefits of integrating all CSR aspects into a sustainability management system are often claimed. Stakeholder theory can advance CSR practice. This case study explores how a company reacts to and appropriates stakeholder theory through interviews and workshops with the top management of corporate responsibility. This is an empirical addition to the dominant conceptual contributions to stakeholder management framed within the concept of management system thinking. The focus is on identification of stakeholders and the estimation of “who and what really counts”. This study support conceptual papers and suggest Mitchell and colleagues’ model for the initial step of SMS. It shows that theory easily can be practised and that it works well. The company highlighted the discussions where it had to look at stakeholders from different perspectives.

Tony Addison and Alan Roe (ed.), WIDER studies in development economics. Oxford University press, 2018, ISBN: 9780198817369

Mineral exploration is an industry of uncertainties. Only 0,1% of exploration projects become mines, as the volume, content, and quality of a deposit all must be economically justifiable to find funding in the global financial market. However, the business risk of mineral exploration is not limited to geotechnical and financial risks, as social aspects are now considered the biggest risk facing the industry. Here, we identify three social aspects of business risk that may challenge the industry: political, reputational, and local acceptability. Political risk arises when sectoral authorities and the related legislation come into conflict, such as mineral versus environmental legislation. Reputational risk lies in the relationship between a company’s past and current operations in combination with the legitimacy of the entire industry. Local acceptability risk parallels the social license to operate, with poor corporate conduct, competition with other livelihoods, intrusion into culturally sensitive areas, and local values critical of mining all potentially evoking resistance. Companies must be aware not only of the nuances of each social aspect but also of the interplay between them to understand the full scale and scope of the business risks associated with exploration.